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IN THIS ISSUE .....
Pete Thomas, editor of the Miners' Union 
journal Common Cause, outlines the history 
of the recent miners' strike against Utah and 
discusses some of its implications.
Marian Sling writes on the comparisons 
and relations between Eurocommunism and 
the experiences and policies of the  
Czechoslovak Communist Party since 1 945. 
The article does not refer mainly to the 
Prague Spring, but to the experiences of the 
transition period 1945-48 . Marian Sling is a 
British communist who was the wife of Otto 
Sling, one of the leading Czech communists 
executed during the purges of the early 
'fifties.
We publish an interview with a woman 
shop steward at the Sanyo factory in 
Wodonga, conducted during the workers' 
occupation of the factory in July.
Beverly Symons writes about the threat of 
the arms race and the importance of the 
struggle against it.
Giuliano Procacci, an Italian professor of 
history and m em ber of the Italian  
Communist Party central committee, writes 
on the case of Nikolai Bukharin, one of the 
many leading Bolsheviks executed in the 
Stalin purges of the 'thirties. The article 
translated from the Italian by Dave Davies, is 
accompanied by other relevant material.
Gerry Phelan, lecturer in Sociology at 
Macquarie University, writes on the future 
role of the trade unions.
Eric Aarons reviews John Sendy's book
Comrades Come Rally, an account of the 
author's experiences in the Communist 
Party.
A review by Roger Coates of Tim Rowse’s 
book Australian Liberalism and National 
Character and a comment by Doug Olive on 
R u p ert L o c k w o o d 's  B lack  Arm ada  
complete the issue.
CORRECTION
Due to a translation problem  there 
w as an error  in the article on  the West 
Germ an anti-nuclear m ovem ent in the 
last ALR (No. 65).
On page 43, first colum n, a sentence 
states:
‘According to official reports, 230 injured 
police were receiving hospital treatment for 
two days afterwards.
It appears the orig inal Germ an text 
refers to 230 police-in jured people; 
that is, 230 people injured by the police.
ALR regrets the error.
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Editorial Statement
Just over ten years ago, on the night o f 
August 20-21, 1968, a massive invasion o f 
Warsaw Pact forces stopped in its tracks the 
C zech oslovak  attem pt to develop  a 
‘socialism with a human face’ . Seasonally, it 
was the end o f summer, with autumn yet to 
com e . P o l i t ic a l ly ,  the s p r in g t im e  
regeneration which had lasted for nearly 
seven months, turned to winter overnight, 
covering the political landscape with a 
thickening blanket o f  grey, bureaucratic 
snow which gradually withered all the 
shoots o f the ‘Prague Spring’ .
A decade after the events it is valuable to 
assess the impact o f both the Prague Spring 
and the invasion which ended it. The 1968 
events in Czechoslovakia took their place 
alongside other major developments in that 
remarkable year, such as the Tet offensive in 
Viet Nam and the May events in France. The 
Czechoslovak and French events were of 
particular importance to the communist and 
left movements in advanced capitalist 
countries.
The developments o f the Prague Spring 
showed that there was no inherent conflict 
between socialism and democracy and that, 
for all the problems o f bureaucracy and 
repression in Eastern Europe, the system 
could change ‘ from within’ to a more 
democratic and ‘human’ socialism.
The dem ocratic evolu tion  o f  Czech 
socialism was undoubtedly supported by the 
vast majority o f the Czechoslovak people. 
Large numbers o f them wanted to see it go 
further and pushed impatiently for more 
change, creating difficulties for the party 
leadership which also felt increasingly the 
pressures from the Soviet Union for the 
changes to be stopped and reversed.
The invasion not only put an end to the 
wishes of the Czech party and people to build 
socialism in accord with their national needs 
and traditions. It also ended any short-term 
possibility o f significant evolution of the 
Soviet bloc to a more democratic socialism 
which would appeal to the masses in the 
advanced capitalist countries.
I jj N S W  « O U T H  W A t m
In this respect, Czechoslovakia was a 
watershed for the communist movements in 
these countries, both by raising the practical 
possibility o f an alternative to the Soviet 
model and by forcing them, after the 
in v a s io n , to e la b o r a te  th a t  m od e l 
themselves, and new political strategies to 
achieve it. Despite differences o f situation, 
policy and strategy, a number o f communist 
parties in advan ced  countries have 
developed similar commitments to socialist 
dem ocracy  and a dem ocratic road to 
socialism.
The Soviet invasion also brought to a head 
the conflict between the political needs o f the 
western parties in their own countries and 
the decades-long loyalty to the Soviet Union. 
Those parties which saw their prime 
contribution to socialist internationalism to 
be the struggle for socialism in their own 
country had to take an in crea sin g ly  
independent path from the Soviet party, and 
to make that independence crystal clear to 
their own working class and people.
The invasion and the bureaucratic, 
centralist and repressive model o f socialism 
it reimposed, have played a useful role for 
capitalism in the west. Like the denial o f 
rights and the trials o f dissidents in the 
Soviet Union, they serve the useful purposes 
o f drawing attention away from the ills o f 
b u r e a u c r a t ic  s o c ia l is m . In t o d a y ’ s 
conditions, this is a key element in capitalist 
ideological domination. In various ways, the 
idea is pushed that whatever people’s 
problems in the West they can ’t be as bad as 
the lack o f democracy in the East. ‘Better the 
devil you know than the one you don ’t’ is the 
catch-phrase and, to a large extent, it works.
Ten years later Czechoslovakia itself 
suffers from the same problems that only the 
continuation o f the Prague Spring could 
have overcome.
So long as an unwanted regime and 
socialist model are imposed there cannot be 
the social dynamism which is essential if 
socialism is to prove its superiority over 
capitalism.
Socialists in the west, while developing 
their own roads to, and models of, socialism 
should not forget the contribution o f the 
Praeue Soring, nor its leaders who, like 
forestry worker, DubceK, under restrictive 
house arrest, still suffer to this day for their 
attempt to do the same.
MINEWORKERS MINERS VS A 
FOUR LETTER MULTINATIONAL 
Pete Thomas
Some Notes on the Utah Strike
Let Utah Development Co., in its words 
(from a handbook issued to employees) 
define its philosophy on what it should pay 
workers at the Utah mines:
The rate o f  pay o f  the individual should 
be adequate with regard to the functions 
he is perform ing and in comparison with 
others in the community, but not so great 
as to provoke discontent with other 
em p lo y ees  or in the rest o f  the  
community...
Applying that principle to the Utah 
mineworkers in its own inimitable way, 
Utah has been the most massive exploiter o f 
Australian workers. For example, with a 
total workforce o f under 2900 (and that 
includes office staff, executives, the lot), 
Utah Development’s pre-tax profit in 1977 
was equ iva len t to $100,282 for each 
employee, and even its after-tax profit 
worked out at over $55,000 for each employee. 
Those sort o f figures could turn even BHP 
an envious peagreen.
Or take an individual example. At the 
Utah mines, drivers o f  the huge Euclid trucks 
take loads o f around 120 tonnes at a time, 
and they might make 12 to 15 trips in a day. 
In about six o f those trips, in half a day or 
less, a driver hauls coal to the value o f his 
own pay for a year.
It w as that situation  o f  im m ense 
exploitation which Utah mineworkers set 
out, in their June-July strike, to diminish a 
bit — and that’s what they did.
As is well-known — and the outbursts o f 
Fraser, Lynch & Co. made it even better 
known — the Utah workers, after over six 
weeks on strike, secured gains which, one 
way and another, in cash or equivalents, 
could add up to $95 a week, or more than 
double the peak Utah propositions in 
negotiations before the strike. Also, the gains 
were free from Utah’s initial odious string o f 
extension o f seven-day roster (that is, work 
continuing through the weekends, public 
holidays, etc.) in certain areas o f work.
The Utah unionists gams are the biggest 
secured by a strike by industrial workers 
(even though, as we’ll see later, the benefits 
have to be put in a proper context). And the 
strike itself — with some 1750 workers from 
four different unions at Australia’s four 
biggest coal mines out for over six weeks — is 
the biggest for years in the coalmining 
industry, and hasn’t many parallels in other 
industries either.
This remarkable strike was undertaken by 
workers who are young and relatively new, 
and in circumstances o f some difficulty.
The Utah mines have been in production 
for only ten years or less. The towns for them 
are in isolated areas, varying from 120 to 150 
miles inland from the Central Queensland 
coast and are almost entirely dependent on 
coalmining. They are in areas which elect 
National (Country) Party members o f 
Parliament.
For its mine workforces, Utah recruited 
workers, mostly young (even in their teens), 
from a variety o f jobs: many o f them from 
rural primary industry. Few o f the workers
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who were taken on at the mines had 
experience or family backgrounds in mining; 
some had not previously been in any union.
The Utah Style
Utah came to Australia with an anti-union 
record. (Not that this is exceptional among 
US coal companies: only half o f U SA ’s soft 
coal is mined under United Mine Workers’ 
Association ‘contract’). Utah hoped to have 
docile workforces here. But Utah itself, by its 
arrogance and hardline style, created a clear 
need for strong unionism, in defence, and 
impelled the development o f this. Utah 
actions produced their appropriate reactions. 
Some outstanding local figures arose in the 
unions, and the union developments were 
cultivated by State leaderships.
Utah, however, kept trying. One o f its 
practices was its “ one for one” system: If the 
workers had a stop of, say, 24 or 48 hours, 
then — no matter how strong the workers’ 
reason might have been — Utah, for no other 
reason except reprisal, would suspend or 
stand down the workers (without pay) for an 
equivalent period. Therefore, when workers 
voted for a 24-hour or 48-hour stop, this 
meant 48 hours or 96 hours out the gate.
In 1975, too, when the campaign was on 
about the unions’ claims for a new award, 
Utah showed its form by standing down the 
1700-odd Utah workers for about three 
weeks.
Even when there has been no major 
general campaign, the frictions at Utah 
mines are reflected by the fact that in 1977 
workers at Peak Downs mine, for instance, 
lost 39 days (the equivalent o f almost eight 
weeks’ working time) in stoppages and in 
Utah get-square stand-downs.
Utah’s ’ ’one for one”  scheme o f stand- 
downs may now, however, have suffered a 
check. A decision in June by the Coal 
Industry Tribunal, while made in general 
terms and not specifically relating to Utah, 
implied a warning against “ abuse” of the 
stand-down power: employers could even 
find that, having stood down workers and so 
lost the production, they could still be held 
liable to pay the workers.)
Part o f the Utah style is to demand 
consistent overtime, which enables it to keep 
the numbers o f its workforces to a minimum. 
For Utah, the award’s 35-hour week is not
enough, and there have been cases o f 
workers being stood down by Utah in 
punishment for their having worked only 
seven hours in a day (the award time) and not 
doing the overtime Utah wanted.
It was ch aracteristic  that — in a 
propaganda document designed to “ sell”  the 
idea o f seven-day roster — Utah gave various 
figures o f  potential earnings on the basis o f a 
range o f  weekly hours, and the range o f 
hours started not at the award’s 35 but at 40 
and went on to 42 and 48 hours.
Over the years, for all its vast profits, Utah 
kept the workers’ pay at levels substantially 
below those which have applied at a number 
o f NSW mines. While there is a common 
award wage scale in the industry in NSW, 
Queensland and Tasmania, workers in NSW 
work under a scheme o f bonuses. These are 
based on production, and bonus schemes 
vary between different mines and different 
companies. At some mines, bonuses run as 
high as $100 and more a week. Against this, 
Utah has been paying only a $23 weekly 
over-award rate. Moreover, this $23 has 
stood still since 1972, with Utah rejecting 
persistent union efforts to restore the 1972 
relativity o f the over-award rate. The 
contrast between the stationary Utah over­
award rates and the immense boom in Utah 
profits in that same 1972-77 period (from a 
net $15 million in 1972 to $158 million in
1977) aggravated the workers’ acute sense o f 
grievance.
Utah mineworkers, too, viewed with 
sympathy the efforts o f the Seamen’s Union 
to get jobs for Australian seafarers on the 
Utah bulk ships which take huge cargoes o f 
the coal away, and mineworkers shared the 
seamen’s resentment and disgust at Utah’s 
persistence with confining the manning to 
“ crews o f convenience”  and excluding 
Australians.
In all these circumstances, the strike from 
June 7 onwards was around the Combined 
Mining U nions’ claims but it also was an 
eruption o f  long-smouldering frustrations 
and exasperations.
In that respect, it had a similarity with the 
Mt. Isa Mines dispute o f 1964-65, in which 
workers’ resentment against the practices o f 
the com pany (like Utah, a US subsidiary) 
boiled over, this being followed by the 
months-long lockout by the company. There 
is another point o f similarity, too: Utah’s
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industrial relations ch ief, Mr. R. L. 
Livingstone, was No. 2 industrial-relations 
man with Mt. Isa Mines during the 1964-65 
lockout. He could have been hankering for a 
Utah emulation o f the Mt. Isa affair.
“ Final O ffers”
Before the Utah strike began, strong 
efforts were made by the unions to secure a 
settlement o f  the claims by negotiations. But 
Utah would not come across. Its style was to 
p re se n t  som e in a d e q u a te  c o u n t e r ­
propositions and declare that these were “ the 
final offer” . Over a period, Utah “ final 
offers” took on the quantity, though not the 
quality, o f Melba farewells.
In the weeks before the strike, Utah “ final 
offers” proposed a bonus scheme which was 
initially reckoned as being worth $17 a week 
(on top o f the $23 over-award rate) and which 
was then increased, under another “ final 
offer” , to $30, together with various other 
improvements reckoned as being worth 
about $12 or so a week. But, to these, Utah
tied the string o f seven-day roster in 
trainloading, open-cut examination, coal- 
preparation plants and some areas of 
maintenance.
An estimate by miners put the value o f the 
Utah propositions for the workers at about $3 
million a year, as against a benefit to Utah of 
$22 million from such a seven-day roster. In 
any case, as Utah well knew, miners’ policy 
is firmly against any extension o f seven-day 
roster in the industry.
Utah’s design for seven-day roster had an 
in d u s try -w id e , a n d  ev en  n a t io n a l , 
significance. Utah already — because o f the 
quality and nature o f its coal resources, its 
open-cut methods and immense productivity, 
its scale o f operations and other factors — is 
able to undercut most o f  the other mine 
companies and jostle them in the scramble 
for contracts and “ spot”  sales (sales which 
are picked up outside the normal long-term 
contracts).
If Utah had been able to get an extension o f 
seven-day roster, it would have further
Utah and Its Family Tree
Utah Developm ent Co. operates four big 
open  cut m ines in C entral Creek  
(Goonyella, Peak Downs, Saraji and 
Blackwater) and has another open cut 
(Norwich Park) and the Harrow Creek 
t r i a l  u n d e r g r o u n d  m i n e  u n d e r  
construction. It is by far the biggest 
producer and exporter o f Australian coal 
(16 m illion  ton n es in 1977, w orth  
som ething like $50 a tonne).
Utah Development is incorporated in 
Nevada (USA) and is 89.2 per cent owned  
by Utah International Inc. o f San 
Francisco. In turn, Utah International is 
merged with General Electric, which 
Fortune last year ranked No. 9 among the 
g ia n t US corpora tion s. H elped  by 
d i v i d e n d  p a y m e n t s  f r o m  U t a h  
Developm ent totalling $126 million in a 
year, General E lectric’s net profit last year 
was over $US1000 million, including 
Utah International’s $US196 million.
The o th er  10.8 p er cen t o f  Utah 
Developm ent is held by Utah Mining 
Australia Ltd. (UMAL which was set up 
for the specific purpose o f holding som e 
Utah shares. Insurance companies and
faceless nominee groups are major 
shareholders in UMAL.
Saraji, Peak Downs, Goonyella and the 
Hay Point export terminal south o f  
Mackay are operated by a 76'A per cent 
subsidiary o f  Utah Development. This is 
Central Queensland Coal Associates 
(CQCA). Other shareholders in CQCA are 
Mitsubishi o f  Japan (with 12 per cent), 
Australian Mutual Provident Society (7:,A 
per cent) and UMAL (4 per cent).
Utah Development also has a one-third 
interest in Mt. Goldsworthy (WA iron ore), 
but this is overshadowed by Utah’s 
Queensland coal operations.
On the union side, the Combined 
Mining Unions in Queensland are made 
up o f the Queensland Colliery E m ployees’ 
Union (QCEU, which is the Queensland 
part o f the M iners’ Federation), the 
Federated Engine Drivers & Firem en’s 
Association, the Amalgamated Metal 
Workers & Shipwrights’ Union, and the 
Electrical Trades Union. Approxim ate 
total numbers o f CMU workers at the 
Utah mines are: QCEU 660, FED & FA 
550, AMSWU 460, ETU 120.
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increased its cost advantage over other coal 
com panies. These w ould have been 
compelled to seek seven-day roster for their 
own mines and, if they couldn’t get it, then 
some could have had to cut back or even 
close, for want o f market competitiveness 
with Utah.
(Six years ago, it was the capture o f a 
market in Italy by Utah from Clutha that 
was the immediate cause o f Clutha deciding 
to close South Clifton mine, on the NSW 
coast: a decision which precipitated the first 
coalmine work-in in Australia, and possibly 
the world.)
Workers’ Actions
Meanwhile, with Utah not com ing through 
with any satisfactory proposals in the 1978 
negotiations, Utah mineworkers had been 
taking concerted forays into industrial 
action; stoppages for a day or two, overtime 
limits (including refusal to load the huge coal 
trains for the coast on overtime at weekends) 
and so on. These had been getting Utah off 
balance and, o f major importance, it had 
been causing a diminution of the huge 
stockpiles which Utah likes to maintain at 
Hay Point and Gladstone, on the coast. (“ If 
the Hay Point stockpile gets down to a 
million tonnes, Utah starts to worry” , one 
rank-and-file Utah man told me.)
As a result, when the strike did start, Utah 
quickly ran through its port stockpiles (and 
stockpiles at the mines were o f no use to Utah 
when it couldn’t get the coal loaded for the 
coast) and so Utah’s contracted shipments 
had to be suspended.
One effect o f the development and co­
ordination o f  these tactics was a heightening 
o f the stature o f the newly-established Utah 
Combined Mining Unions (CMU) regional 
liaison committee, which was heading the 
on-the-spot campaign at the four mines. This 
rank-and-file committee consists o f one 
representative o f each o f the four unions in 
the CMU at each o f the four mines. In this 
set-up, the rank-and-file at each mine have 
four representatives and (looking at it 
another way) each o f our four unions also has 
four representatives. This identity o f the 
committee with the rank-and-file has been, 
and continues to be, of major significance.
Over years, Utah has tried to play unions 
o ff against each other and to needle in efforts
to create divisions between them. Despite 
this, it was a major aspect o f this whole 1978 
dispute with Utah that the rank-and-file o f 
the four unions acted throughout as one solid 
body, free from any bickering or narrow one- 
upmanship. This must have been one o f the 
things that dismayed Utah and culminated 
in Utah’s ultimate capitulation. I f sustained, 
it can be a formidable obstacle to Utah’s anti­
union designs.
In the dispute, too, it was o f importance 
that Utah produces coal predominantly for 
overseas markets. Because o f this, a halt in 
Utah production does not disrupt domestic 
supplies for power generation and so on and 
does not have any disadvantageous impact 
on the community. This fact lessened the 
pretexts o f  the Bjelke-Petersen government 
for bluster and incitement against the 
unionists.
The Strike Begins
When Utah in May put up its latest “ final 
offer” , with the seven-day roster tied to it, the 
miners’ Queensland District Board o f 
Management and then the State CMU 
committee rejected the string and sought 
talks with Utah to get a proposition without 
this. But Utah hung on to the string — and 
the strike was on.
The actual strike decision was made by 
mass CMU meetings on June 7 at Moranbah 
(the town for Peak Downs and Goonyella), 
Dysart (Saraju) and Blackwater. The voting 
was a highly impressive 899 to 69.
The same June 7 meetings also voted on a 
recommendation to reject Utah’s seven-day 
roster proposition. Voting on this was 948 to 
24: a solid No to Utah. Significantly, those in 
this vote (and, naturally, in all others) 
included FED & FA men, who themselves 
work seven-day roster on the giant draglines. 
They voted in inter-union solidarity against 
having seven-day rosters extended to 
members o f the other unions.
As far as the unions were concerned, that 
was the end o f Utah’s seven-day roster 
notion: there was no need for any more votes 
on it. It just wasn’t on.
That June 7 strike vote was for a week’s 
stop, with a call to Utah to negotiate 
genuinely. At the end o f the week (on a 
Wednesday, at midnight) work resumed. 
Work continued  at Peak D ow ns and
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Goonyella through the Thursday and 
Friday, but Blackwater and Saraji men 
worked only on the Thursday because the 
Friday was, for them, a holiday for the Show 
Day in the Rockhampton area.
Then, after that 24/48 hours o f work, the 
workers again stopped for 24/48 hours from 
midnight on the Sunday in order to have new 
CMU mass meetings — and at those 
meetings they voted 1173 to 7 to box on and 
stay on strike for another week.
Each Monday for the next four weeks, that 
same recommendation, for another week on 
strike, was put to mass CMU meetings and 
was carried by extraordinarily solid votes: 
972 to 4, then 1158 to 6, the following Monday 
1146 to 5, then 1165 to 7. The figures speak 
eloquently for themselves.
Yet, in those circumstances, the Bjelke- 
Petersen Queensland government’s Mines 
Minister (Mr. Camm) came out with a 
statement (Courier-Mail, July 3) saying: “I 
believe that, given a free vote, with no 
pressure from militant unionists directed by 
people in southern states, the majority o f 
miners in this state would reject any strike 
action and go-slow procedures” . It was a
piece o f absurd nonsense only too typical of 
the Bjelke-Petersen government.
Methods of Struggle
The pattern of having strike votes for 
periods o f only one week at a time was 
deliberate. It caused some anxiety among a 
few well-intentioned officials o f unions who 
saw it as a possible encouragement to any 
anti-strike movement. Such anxieties proved 
to be unfounded.
The process o f weekly meetings was, in 
fact, one of the great strengths. It gave the 
workers a full opportunity, at proper 
meetings, to say anything they wanted to put 
up, and then to have a vote on what was to be 
done. It was an important safeguard against 
any feeling among workers o f being kept 
outside what might be happening.
A n o t h e r  i n n o v a t i o n  w a s  th e  
establishment o f union centres, manned 
during the day, as a place where anyone — 
inside or outside the unions — could come for 
information or just to talk. Normally none of 
these mining towns has any full-time union 
organisation. The establishment o f a
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m a n n ed  ce n tre  w as an  in n o v a t io n  
introduced at Blackwater at a time in June 
when the Utah strike coincided with the 
strike at the other mines in the Blackwater 
area over the Fraser government’s threat to 
tax subsidised housing. The Blackwater 
initiative o f a manned centre was taken up 
elsewhere in what the com pany likes to call 
“ Utah country” .
Meetings o f women in the mining towns 
were held and voted support for the strike. As 
a result o f women’s involvement, Women’s 
Auxiliaries were, by the end o f the strike, set 
up in Blackwater, Moranbah and Dysart. 
These have important potential.
During the strike, an existing Auxiliary 
a„ Moura sent a $1000 donation for the Utah 
strikers’ families.)
T h e  o t h e r  C e n t r a l  Q u e e n s la n d  
mineworkers’ upsurge in June against the 
Canberra threat to tax subsidised rentals 
housing reinforced the Utah workers’ strike. 
Strikes by mineworkers in the Blackwater 
area at BHP’s Cook and Leichhardt mines 
and Thiess’s South Blackwater mines helped 
to promote an “ all in together” strike spirit 
with the Utah strikers. Workers from Utah’s 
Blackwater mine joined, with gusto, in the 
Blackwater mineworkers and community 
march and rally against the tax. Then Utah 
workers at Moranbah (Peak Downs and 
Goonyella) and others made com loon cause 
by organising a similar demonstration there 
against the tax threat: a threat from which 
the Fraser government, under such pressure, 
appears to have backed off.
In the course o f the Utah strike, too, 
mineworkers at the next biggest group in 
Q ueensland (the B H P-Thiess-M itsui 
consortium’s Moura-Kianga mines) were 
also in dispute; in their case over long- 
withheld satisfaction on a bonus scheme. 
This produced a 48-hour strike in June. This, 
too, helped to give Utah strikers a sense of 
added dimension.
As week followed week in the Utah strike, 
the need for financial help grew.
Solidarity
From early in the strike, the Utah CMU 
reg ion a l lia ison  com m ittee organ ised  
delegations to go to other mining areas o f 
Queensland and NSW. Altogether, nine 
delegates came to NSW alone.
They included men from the miners. FED 
& FA and AMWSU. Am ong them were the 
miners’ Queensland Board o f Management 
member for the area that includes Goonyella, 
Peak Downs and Saraji, and the president, 
secretary and treasurer o f  the Utah CMU 
regional liaison committee. Throughout the 
Queensland and NSW areas, they received 
strong support, backed by weekly levies.
One notable example o f support came from 
Broken Hill. Broken Hill is a long way from 
Central Queensland. Old-timers at Broken 
Hill couldn’t remember a previous occasion 
when rank-and-file Queensland coalmining 
delegates had been there. Broken Hill isn ’t in 
coal anyway: the mines are metalliferous. 
But, after hearing the Utah CMU delegates, 
a Broken Hill CMU meeting voted an 
immediate $10,000 initial donation — and a 
cheque for the $10,000 was made out and 
handed over within five minutes o f the 
meeting ending. That sort o f unqualified 
solidarity is a characteristic which critics o f 
some aspects o f Broken Hill, ranging 
sideways politically across from Lady 
Braddon, should not overlook.
Support in Queensland and NSW was not 
confined to the four unions which had 
members involved in the strike. Those who 
contributed included seamen, waterside 
workers, ironworkers, clerks, and others, and 
votes o f support were carried by both the 
Queensland Trades & Labor Council and the 
NSW Labor Council.
Young Leaders
The ages o f the Utah CMU delegates who 
cam e to NSW  illustrate the relative 
youth o f leading Central Queensland 
mining unionists. O f the six whose ages I 
checked, two were in their 20s and the eldest 
o f them all was 36. (Those others whose ages 
I forgot to ask about were also certainly 
within this age range.) The secretary o f the 
Utah CMU regional liaison committee, Gary 
Cox, was still 24 when the strike ended. Even 
younger is Andrew Vickers, who is 23 — and 
at that age he is a member o f the miners’ 
Q ueensland Board o f  M anagem ent, 
secretary o f  the Utah miners’ merger 
committee, chairman o f the Goonyella CMU 
and has been secretary o f the Goonyella 
miners’ branch (with over 170 members) for 
four years. Those who are in their 30s include 
the chairman o f the Utah CMU regional
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liaison committee (and formerly for four 
years Peak Downs miners’ chairman), Bill 
Coffey, who is 33.
It was men o f  those ages who gave the on- 
the-spot leadersh ip  in bu ild ing and 
sustaining a strike that Utah couldn’t crack.
(Outside the Utah group, another miners’ 
branch secretary, Paul Grainger, when he 
turned 21 last year, was already in his fourth 
year as secretary o f the Blair Athol miners’ 
branch.)
Despite the generosity o f the support, 
things were tough for the strikers and their 
families. The first distribution was not 
possible until July 14, five weeks after the 
strike began, and even then it averaged only 
around $35 each (scaled according to 
num ber o f  dependants). A second 
distribution was made a week later (on a 
scale which included $50 for a man, wife and 
two children). So, at the time when the strike 
ended, total payments to a family o f four had 
been less than $100. (A third payment was 
made in the first days back at work, to help 
tide them over.)
The continued strike solidarity was all the 
more remarkable in those circumstances.
Utah Cracks
As everyone now knows, it was Utah, and 
not the workers, which eventually cracked. 
The effects o f the strike had been severely 
hurting even such a mammoth outfit as 
General Electric. In an unpublicised mission, 
a top GE industrial-relations man flew to 
Australia. Utah s chief in Australia (Mr. 
Winterer) went to Canberra (again without 
publicity) to see Prime Minister Fraser. The 
Government then got the ACTU president 
(Mr. Hawke) to intervene. In mid-July, Mr. 
Hawke went to Brisbane and, after that, to 
Moranbah for negotiations. Federal and 
State officials of the Miners’ Federation, 
State officials o f the other CMU unions and 
(very importantly) the members o f the rank- 
and-file  U tah CMU reg ional lia ison  
committee all took part in those negotiations. 
Miners’ Queensland Board member Andrew 
Vickers, o f Goonvella, told Common Cause 
(Miners’ Federation journal) that, at their 
very first talks with Mr. Hawke, “ the 
message came across very strongly to Mr. 
Hawke about the workers' solidarity and 
determination".
Without much enthusiasm, the Utah 
workers on July 21 agreed to resume work to 
allow  the n egotiation s to proceed in 
Moranbah. Their reluctance was shown by 
the fact that, in the voting on the “ go back, 
for now anyway” recommendation, there 
was the biggest minority (95) in any vote 
during the whole dispute.
On the Monday (July 24), the men went to 
work. On the Tuesday afternoon, Utah’s 
attitude caused the talks to break down. 
Workers’ reaction was immediate and 
dramatic. Without even needing to have 
meetings to decide on it, they trooped o ff the 
jobs, less than 48 hours after they had 
resumed following six weeks on strike.
That was when Utah gave in: against such 
solidarity and spirit, Utah chiefs realised 
that they’d had it. Their coal shipments had 
been halted for weeks, their vaunted 
reputation for “ reliability” on contracts was 
in a mess, and the whole situation was 
running contrary to what the Financial 
Review defined as being General Electric’s 
consistent policy: “ Produce at any price” .
As a result, there were midnight and early- 
morning knocks on doors at the Moranbah 
motel. Hurried new talks took place (in which 
it was discovered that, without Mr. Hawke or 
the other union representatives having been 
told, Utah chief Winterer him self was on the 
scene there). Later on that Wednesday 
m orning, the settlem ent term s were 
formalised. On being put to the Utah CMU 
mass meetings the next day (July 27), the 
terms were accepted by 1339 votes to 7. The 
strike was over.
The terms included a direct pay rise, by an 
increase in the weekly all-purpose over­
award rate from the old figure o f $23 to a new 
amount o f $35: this to have a six-monthly 
indexing (so it w on’t again, as in the 1972-78 
years, stand still). There also was the 
‘package ot conditions’ (including some 
relating to living conditions), as put forward 
by Utah before the strike. The biggest pay 
rise is to be through a progressively-scaled 
production bonus. According to initial 
discussions, this bonus will start (possibly at 
about $30 a week) if production is only 70 per 
cent o f the 1977 output. If production is 100 
per cent o f the 1977 figure, the weekly bonus 
would be about $55; at 105 per cent, it would 
be $63, and there would be further rises in 
bonus (without any ceiling) on any higher
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production figures. Periodic reviews o f the 
bonus scheme are to be made.
A combination o f  all those gains provided 
the publicised figure o f $95 a week as the 
possible improvement.
Repercussions
T h o u g h  th e  s t r ik e  w a s  e n d e d , 
reverberations kept rolling. A  Financial 
Review editorial was headed: “ After Utah, 
a new wages gam e” , and a National Times 
article, headed “ Utah — winners and losers” , 
saw the settlement as having “ the seeds o f 
serious consequences for other employers” 
(does that grieve you?)
Most extraordinary o f all, however, was 
the reaction o f the Fraser Government: the 
Government which had initiated the Hawke 
intervention and whose Prime Minister had 
immediately been informed o f the settlement 
terms before they were publicly known. In 
what Opposition Leader Hayden called “ a 
concerted attack, orchestrated by the Prime 
Minister” , two days later, Fraser himself, 
Lynch and Business Affairs Minister Fife 
fired o ff a frenzied fusillade at the settlement 
terms: “ outrageous” , “ a shameless money 
grab” , etc. etc.
Obviously, they were dismayed at a 
prospect o f the Utah settlement encouraging 
other sections o f workers to lift their own 
sights. They were concerned at the possible 
effects on those so-sacred guidelines, by 
which the Government strives to confine 
workers’ claims at the same time as the same 
Government agitates to deny workers even 
bare cost-of-living adjustments to wages.
They were, perhaps most o f all, alarmed at 
the force o f the Utah workers’ example, in 
showing how trade unionists can challenge 
and beat one o f the world’s most powerful 
multinationals: an example most distasteful 
to Fraser & Co.
It is much to be hoped that all o f these 
points o f concern to the Government do 
indeed come about. If so, the credit due to the 
Utah mineworkers will be all the greater.
The Utah workers won: there’s no doubt 
about that. But, at the same time, what the 
Utah workers now have is what Utah should 
have been paying them years ago. Even with 
this win, Utah workers will still be paid less 
than some workers at NSW mines where
productivity and profits are below those o f 
Utah. And, in addition, Utah has tied some 
o f the gains to production levels.
On Financial Review figures, if  the 
bonus gets to $63 a week, there will be a total 
extra $8 million payout to the workers in a 
year. But, after that and other costs, Utah 
will benefit by a pre-tax profit increase o f 
about $21 million from the extra production 
which that $63 bonus denotes. This is the sort 
o f trap, for employers’ benefit, which is 
implicit in all “ production” or “ incentive” 
bonus schemes in industry generally.
A point for this Utah scheme, however, is 
that a bonus would be payable at a 
production figure as low as 70 per cent o f 1977 
output. Such a fall in tonnage is highly 
improbable, but it is important that a bonus 
would be paid without any increase in 
production, and even with a fall. Moreover, 
there is the $35 all-purpose over-award rate, 
irrespective o f production tonnages.
Altogether, some added millions o f dollars 
will stay in Australia in workers’ pay, 
instead o f being funnelled away to USA in 
Utah dividends.
While Fraser & Co. rave from the Right, 
there may also be some critics o f the strike 
from the Left, who might probe for any lack 
o f ideological quality or who may invoke 
that fatal word “ economism” . It would, 
certainly, be great if  Australian workers 
gen era lly  shared the doctrines and 
strategic concepts o f  the advanced Left. 
The fact is that they don’t — and it’s the 
Left’s job to avoid delusions and to strive to 
improve on that present position.
As for “ economism” , it was said in an 
address in 1865, in referring to workers’ 
actions: “ ... Their struggles for the standard 
o f wages are incidents inseparable from the 
whole wages system... By cowardly giving 
way in their everyday conflict with capital, 
they would certainly disqualify themselves 
for the initiating o f any larger movement.” 
Would anyone call Marx (who said those 
things) economist-minded?
The challenge to multinationals is one 
such “ larger m ovem en t” . W hat Utah 
mineworkers — and the seamen — have been 
doing has been a significant contributing 
part in this. The real face o f multinationals, 
without the cosmetics, is seen the more 
plainly in Australia because o f it.
THE ARMS 
RACE
Beverley Symons
For years the world has lived under the 
threat o f a nuclear war. Millions who grew up 
in the shadow o f the Bomb have learnt to live 
with and even accept the unstable ‘peace’ o f 
the nuclear ‘balance o f terror’ . The certainty 
that any nuclear attack by one o f the 
Superpow ers would in sta n tly  in v o lve  
massive retaliation, has helped the world to 
get to 1978 without a second use o f nuclear 
weapons.
But, how much longer can it last? Can the 
nuclear world survive into the 21st century? 
For the name o f the nuclear strategy game 
has changed.
The accelerating arms race and the 
technological advances o f the 1970s, coupled 
with the loom ing dangers of the plutonium 
economy, make the chances o f survival seem 
daily more remote. Whether, in fact, a 
nuclear holocaust will eventuate however, 
depends on many factors, not least on the 
ability o f world forces for change prevailing 
over imperialism. But that time is running 
short there is no doubt.
This year has seen a marked deterioration 
in international relations and increasing 
tensions between West and East bloc 
countries, and in other areas. The Middle 
East continues to be a major flash-point with 
the ever-present danger o f widening conflict;
on the African continent and elsewhere the 
struggle for id eo log ica l and m ilitary 
supremacy continues. And the conflict 
between Kampuchea and Viet Nam and 
China’s worsening relations with Viet Nam, 
are closely connected to the mutual distrust 
and jostling for position o f China and the 
Soviet Union.
Ironically, it was the UN first-ever Special 
Session on Disarmament in May which 
highlighted the shaky detente between the 
two Superpowers, neither o f whom sent their 
Heads o f  State. Instead, President Carter 
attended a NATO war-planning meeting in 
Washington and spoke of confrontation with 
the Soviet Union. Soon after, the outcry 
against the trials o f the Soviet dissidents was 
used to further a re-emergence o f Cold War 
hysteria and fear.
Counterforce Strategy
In the early 1960s some American hawks 
wanted to move from ‘deterrence’ to a 
position o f nuclear superiority, and by the 
late 1960s the shift was underway. It is now 
clear that with the tremendous technological 
advances in weaponry in the 1970s and 
emphasis on quality rather than quantity, 
United States’ policy has decidedly shifted 
to w a rd s  a ‘ C o u n t e r f o r c e ’ s tra te g y .
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Translated this means an unanswerable 
first strike capacity.
Form er Lockheed en gin eer and US 
weapons expert, Robert Aldridge, estimates 
that the US should achieve a first-strike 
capacity by the mid-1980s — i.e. in about 
seven years from now. (1)
Defense Secretary, Robert McNamara, 
first expounded the new Counterforce 
doctrine in June 1962. Am erica’s “ principal 
military objective should be the destruction 
o f the enemy’s military forces, not his 
civilian population” , he said. (2) The 
previous year, President Kennedy had stated 
that “ our arms will never be used to strike the 
first blow” , but it was clear his Defense 
Secretary was elaborating a plan, and 
retargeting his missiles, to give the US that 
capability.
Twelve years later, in 1975, Defense 
Secretary S ch lesin ger rephrased the 
doctrine. While telling a Senate Foreign 
Relations Subcommittee that the US has “ no 
desire to develop a counterforce capability 
against the Soviet U nion” , he nevertheless 
went on: “ What we wish to avoid is the Soviet 
Union having a counterforce capability 
against the United States without our being 
able to have a comparable capability.”  
(Emphasis added.) The President must not 
be limited to any single strategy, Schlesinger 
said, but must have the capacity f; ir “ flexible 
response” . (3)
In February 1974 Schlesinger told a Senate 
hearing on the military budget that “ We 
have no announced counterforce strategy, if 
by counterforce one infers that one is going to 
attempt to destroy silos. We have a new 
targeting doctrine th at em phasizes 
selectivity and flexibility” . (Emphasis
added.) And on May 30_1975 Schlesinger
admitted publicly that the US would 
consider using nuclear weapons first to stop 
communist advances such as in Europe and 
Korea. (4)
The new targeting doctrine is designed to 
make limited nuclear war acceptable — after 
all, it sounds more humane to retaliate 
against military targets than population 
areas. But the very concept o f limited nuclear 
war flies in the face o f the inevitable logic o f 
escalation to total force usage. As the 
authoritative Stockholm International 
P eace  R e se a rch  In s t itu te  (S IP R I)  
c o m m e n t e d  a f t e r  S c h l e s i n g e r ’ s
announcement: “ In making nuclear war 
more ‘flexible’ (the new doctrine) makes it 
more th inkable , m ore tolerable  and 
consequently more probable” . (5)
The likelihood o f  ‘ limited’ nuclear strikes 
escalating to an all-out nuclear war in which 
both sides would be devastated, means that 
the only plausible reason for the US 
developing a counterforce capability is to 
a ch ieve the ca p a city  to launch  an 
unanswerable first strike against the Soviet 
Union.
The Arms Race
To understand how the US is moving 
towards that capacity, one needs to examine 
the current state o f  the arm s race, 
particularly technological developments.
The size o f the world’s nuclear stockpiles is 
staggering — representing the capacity to 
destroy every person on earth 24 times over. 
Or put another way, the US could destroy 
every person in the Soviet Union 40 times 
over and the Soviet Union could destroy 
every American 20 times over. These 
frightening, i f  somewhat ludicrous statistics 
illustrate the insanity o f the runaway 
nuclear arms race. (Not to mention the 
insanity o f diverting $400 billion a year 
away from spending on health, alleviating 
poverty and other pressing social needs.)
SIPRI Director, Frank Barnaby, gives the 
following picture o f  the Superpowers’ 
nuclear arsenals at July 1976:
United States: 2,124 strategic nuclear 
delivery system s — 1,054 land-based  
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); 
656 submarine-launched ballistic missiles 
(SLBMs) on 41 strategic nuclear submarines; 
414 strategic bombers. Can deliver about 
8,500 independently targetable nuclear 
warheads.
Soviet Union: 2,404 strategic nuclear 
delivery systems — 1,452 ICBMs; 812 SLBMs 
on 60 strategic nuclear submarines, about 
140 strategic bombers. Can deliver about
4,000 independently targetable nuclear 
warheads.
In addition to their 12,000 or more strategic 
nuclear warheads, both the US and the 
Soviet Union have tens of thousands o f 
tactical nuclear weapons, mostly more 
powerful than the Hiroshima atomic bomb. 
(6)
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The key point however, is not so much the 
number o f strategic delivery vehicles (i.e. 
missiles and bombers) but the total number 
o f bombs that can be delivered. And here the 
US is far ahead.
Most US missiles carry multiple warheads 
(MIRVs — multiple individually-targeted re­
entry vehicles), whereas, Aldridge says, the 
Soviet Union “ has not mastered the ability to 
miniaturize hydrogen bom bs” . For example, 
o f the 41 US ballistic missile submarines, 31 
are armed with 16 Poseidon missiles, each 
missile having 10-14 MIRVs o f 40-kiloton 
yield. “ That means that each of these 31 
Poseidon submarines could destroy at least 
160 cities with bombs at least twice the 
explosive energy that ripped into Hiroshima 
and N agasaki” . (7)
Andrew Mack says that the US has nearly 
three times more nuclear warheads than the 
Soviet Union, largely because o f their five- 
year lead in MIRV technology. He also 
points out that US missiles “ are far more 
accurate than their Soviet counterparts — 
cancelling the m egatonnage/throw weight 
‘advantages’ o f the Soviet missiles” . (8)
From the time the US shifted its nuclear 
strategy from Deterrence to Counterforce, it 
has been modernising and developing its 
nuclear arsenal to achieve a First Strike 
capacity. The whole point o f that capacity is 
to deliver an unanswerable first strike; to 
destroy the enemy’s nuclear weaponry before 
it can strike back. And that means having 
the type o f weapons with the required 
accuracy, which can hit at ‘hard’ targets, i.e. 
land-based missiles in their hardened 
concrete silos, rather than ‘soft’ cities or 
industrial centres.
The US scenario for a disabling first strike 
was spelt out by former Defense Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld in the Pentagon’s annual 
statement o f 1970:
... The most ambitious [damage limiting] 
strategy dictates a first strike capability 
against an enemy’s strategic offensive forces 
which seek to destroy as much of his 
megatonnage as possible before it can be 
brought into play. An enemy’s residual 
retaliation, assumed to be directed against 
urban-industrial targets, would be blunted 
still further by a combination of active and 
passive defenses, including ASW (anti­
submarine warfare), ABMs (anti-ballistic 
missiles), anti-bomber defenses.... (9)
Robert Aldridge details these military 
‘defenses’ as the four major interacting 
systems the US is developing to first strike 
capacity. They are:
A  m issile  arsenal with 
cou n terforce  accu racy  to 
destroy land-based military 
targets;
An anti-submarine (ASW) 
capability that can instantly 
kill the S oviet m issile- 
launching submarines;
An an ti-ba llis tic  m issile 
(ABM) system and an anti­
bomber system to intercept 
residual retaliation;
* A  space-based  system  to
provide com m u nication , 
navigation, weather, and 
intelligence information, as 
well as to track and destroy 
S o v ie t  e a r ly  w a rn in g , 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  a n d  
navigation spacecraft.
As stated above, the biggest technological 
breakthrough was the development of 
MIRVs. And the US is now developing a 
more accurate version — the M ARV — which 
can be remotely manoeuvred during re-entry 
into the earth’s atmosphere to correct any 
deviation from the flight path.
The current development o f the US and 
Soviet nuclear arsenals bears out what has 
always been true o f the arms race, sometimes 
called the “ action-reaction cycle” .
Thus four years after the Hiroshima bomb 
the Soviet Union tested their first A-bomb. 
This was followed a day later by the 
formation o f NATO. Nearly six years later 
the Warsaw Pact was signed. In 1954 the US 
deployed tactical nuclear weapons in 
Europe, followed three years later by the 
Soviet Union. In 1960 the first Polaris 
ballistic missile submarine was launched 
and five  years later the first Soviet 
comparable ballistic missile submarine. The 
Soviet Union tested MIRVs five years after 
the first US tests — the US deployed them in 
1970 and the USSR in 1975. By the time the 
Soviet Union had caught up with and 
exceeded the US in numbers o f ICBMs and 
SLBMs around 1970, the Pentagon had 
already switched their emphasis from
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quantity to quality improvements, in line 
with their shift in strategy from deterrence to 
cqunterforce.
Trident Horror Weapon
The Trident is the US N avy’s plan for 
updating the sea leg of the strategic nuclear 
triad. It will be composed o f a new fleet of 
submarines, two generations o f missiles and 
a sophisticated communications system. 
Engineering development o f Trident began 
in 1971. It is scheduled to be operational in 
1981, with thirty submarines planned by the 
1990s. Trident will be based in the Pacific 
Ocean with its home port in Puget Sound, 
near Bangor, Washington.
Trident submarines will be 560 feet long 
(about two football fields) and about four 
stories high. Each sub will carry 24 missiles, 
half as many again as the present Polaris 
and Poseidon. Its longer-range missiles will 
give Trident ten times as much ocean area in 
which to hide than Poseidon.
Two generations of Trident missiles are 
planned. Trident-I will have a range o f 4,000 
nautical miles with a full load o f eight 100- 
kiloton warheads, while being as accurate as 
Poseidon is at 2,000 miles. Trident-I missiles 
will also be backfitted into 10 Poseidon subs 
as from 1980.
The much larger Trident-I I missiles, due 
by the mid-1980s, will only fit into the new 
Trident submarines. They will have a range 
o f 6,000 nautical miles, carrying fourteen 
150-kiloton warheads or seven 300-kiloton 
MIRV warheads, with an accuracy of 300 
feet. However, by using MARVs on the 
Trident-II missile, that miss distance would 
be whittled down to a few feet.
So each Trident sub equipped with 24 
T r id e n t -I I  m is s ile s  a rm ed  w ith  17 
manoeuvring warheads, would be capable o f 
striking any point on over half the earth’s 
surface. With a typical payload o f 75-100 
kilotons per warhead, oneTrident submarine 
could destroy 408 cities or military targets 
with a blast five times that unleashed on 
Hiroshima. A  fleet o f 30 Trident subs would 
be able to deliver an unbelievable 12,240 
nuclear warheads — 30 times the number 
originally thought sufficient for strategic 
deterrence.
Clearly, if  Trident attains the accuracies 
the Navy seeks, it will constitute the ultimate 
first-strike weapon. (10)
In a Saturday Review  editorial th 
A m erican  jou rn a lis t  N orm an C ousins 
pointed out that a Trident submarine 
commander will be the third m >t powerful 
man in the world, next to the US and Soviet 
Presidents. He will control more destructive
"A TOAST GENTLEMEN. T O  THE NEUTRON BOM B.”
"THE BOURGEOISIE OF THE WHOLE WORLD,WHICH LOOKS COMPLACENTLY 
UPON THE WHOLESALE MASSACRE AFTER THE BATTLE,IS CONVULSED B Y  
HORROR AT THE D E S E C R A T IO N  OF BRICK AND M O R T A R ! ,r
KARL MARX, THE CIVIL WAR IN FRANCE
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force than Britain, Italy, Spain, Brazil, 
Argentina, West Germany, Japan, the 
P h ilipp ines, India and Pakistan  put 
together.
Australia’s Role
In February 1978, US Defense Secretary 
Harold Brown confirmed that Trident 
submarines would be based in the Pacific 
and in June the US Navy announced it would 
deploy 13 Tridents in the Pacific and 
concentrate its nuclear strategy for the 1980s 
in this area. (11)
Writing from Washington, John Edwards 
examined the implications o f this strategy in 
a National Times articles entitled “ Australia 
Moves Into Nuclear Frontline” (March 6-11,
1978): “ Australia is to play a much more 
significant role in the strategic weapons 
planning o f the United States, Russia and 
China” , he said. “This will place Australia in 
the front line of any nuclear exchange 
between the United States and either the 
Soviet Union and China, both o f which latter 
now have the capability to attack targets in 
Australia with nuclear missiles.”
This is evident not only from Defense 
Secretary Brown’s February statement, but 
also from a State Department agency 
announcement to Congress a week later that 
the Soviet Union and the US have agreed in 
the SALT negotiations to accept a mutual 
interim ban on the deployment o f mobile 
land-based intercontinental missiles.
These two statements, says Edwards, 
point to the probability that:
* The Pacific will emerge as the principal 
theatre for the deployment o f US weapons 
directed against Russia and China;
* The US defence communications facilities 
located in Australia will play a pre-eminent 
part in the control of at least a proportion of 
these weapons;
* Australia may play an increasingly important 
role in the protection and maintenance of the 
US Trident fleet, both in the Pacific and in the 
Indian Oceans.
U.S. Bases in Australia
It has long been known that the US 
facilities here were an important part o f the 
US nuclear network, although their exact 
operations have been shrouded in secrecy. In 
1974 a US Navy magazine reported that
“ classified messages to Polaris-Poseidon 
submarines deployed in the Indian Ocean” 
are sent from the North-West Cape Station. 
And as Dr. Des Ball pointed out in 1974, the 
North-West Cape base no longer performs a 
nuclear ‘ s ta b ilis in g ’ role when the 
submarines it controls can deliver accurate 
hard-target weapons. (12)
Out of the 20-30 US military, scientific and 
communications facilities in Australia, the 
three most important are the Defence Space 
Research Station at Pine Gap near Alice 
Springs; the Defence Space Communications 
Station at Nurrungar, near Woomera; and 
the Harold E. Holt Naval Communications 
Centre at North West Cape, Western 
Australia.
The Pine Gap base, established in 1968, 
had its lease renewed in 1977 for a further 10 
years. Built at a cost o f $250 million, it is the 
largest and most important base o f its kind 
outside United States territory. One o f its 
major functions is to receive, analyse and 
transmit data from 647 early warning 
satellites, which are used to detect missile 
lau n ch ings, and from  the ‘ B ig B ird ’ 
surveillance satellite placed over the USSR, 
China, India and Indo-China. Two private 
American companies — TRW and F-Systems
— control the Pine Gap operations.
The Nurrungar station provides a back­
up function for Pine Gap. It transmits 
satellite early warning and reconnaissance 
data generated by Pine Gap via military 
satellite to US command centres.
T h e  N o r t h  W e s t  C a p e  n a v a l  
communications station transmits very low 
frequency (VLF) radio signals to submerged 
nuclear m issile -carry ing  subm arines, 
enabling them to launch their missiles 
without surfacing to receive firing orders.
The strategic importance o f North-West 
Cape will be further upgraded by a new 
satellite system, AN-MSC-61. When installed 
in 1980, it will be one o f  21 new facilities 
around the world forming part o f the latest 
p h a se  o f  the US d e fe n s e  s a te l li te  
communications system.
A US company was awarded a contract in 
1977 to supply the satellite terminals. But the 
Australian people, Parliament and even the 
Government, were not informed about this 
upgrading until the information was picked 
up in May 1978 from a leaked US Congress 
memo.
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The Omega navigation station planned 
for Gippsland in Victoria also has a 
significant role to play in the sea leg o f the 
US nuclear network. Its fun ction , in 
con ju n ction  w ith seven  other Om ega 
stations elsewhere, is to allow world-wide all- 
weather navigation for all kinds o f craft, 
both military and civilian. VLF Omega 
signals penetrate sea water to considerable 
depths, so a com pletely  subm erged 
submarine can be guided through any seas 
without revealing its position.
US bases have long made Australia a 
target in the event o f a nuclear war. With the 
development o f Trident as a first-strike 
weapon, any pretence that the bases play a 
defensive rather than an offensive role, is 
shattered. Even journalist Alan Reid, who 
could hardly be classified as a left-winger, 
recently warned o f the dangers to Australia 
from the shift in US nuclear strategy:
... If Australia is to house a facility which 
contributes to the efficiency of a first-strike 
system, carrying atomic warheads, that is a 
quite different proposition from housing a 
facility which is part of a deterrent ... It 
enhances the priority that the North-West 
Cape base would have as a target in the event 
of a major conflagration. (13)
It is clear that the deployment o f Tridents 
in the Pacific and/or Indian Oceans will 
make North West Cape one o f the most vital 
strategic bases in the world. As John 
Edwards points out:
To achieve the accuracy necessary for a 
flexible response, Trident submarines will 
need to be positioned and the Trident-2 missile 
will need to be corrected in flight from land 
facilities. Both these operations may be 
conducted from Australia.
He concludes that all o f these developments
will draw Australia into a role as the junior 
partner in the Pacific and Indian Ocean 
nuclear competition between the great powers, 
so that the exhausted traditional ANZUS 
alliance of regional conventional co-operation 
will be replaced by a nuclear alliance — and 
one little known to the Australian people.
The Nuclear Connection
Turning from  the vertica l nuclear 
proliferation o f the two Superpowers, the 
other main areas o f  concern are the
increasing militarisation of the entire world 
th ro u g h  th e  sa le  and  t r a n s fe r  o f  
conventional, tactical weapons; and the 
growing horizontal nuclear proliferation 
through the export o f  nuclear pow er 
technology and materials to potential 
nuclear weapon countries.
Some people, including sections of the 
peace movement, argue for development o f 
nuclear power for ‘safe’ peaceful energy 
purposes, which they say is essential for 
economic growth, particularly in the Third 
World. At the same time, they affirm their 
opposition to nuclear power being used for 
nuclear weapons. But is it possible to 
separate the peaceful and military in the real 
politics o f our unstable world, and above all
— how can the safety of future generations be 
assured while nuclear power reactors 
constantly produce deadly wastes which 
must be safely stored virtually forever?
In looking at the connections between 
nuclear weapons and nuclear power, the 
most obvious is the danger o f nuclear 
weapons proliferation. But others include 
nuclear waste, high cost and low job creation 
of both nuclear industries, extreme health 
hazards, nuclear industrial-government 
connections and further steps towards a 
police state.
Reactor waste has received most attention. 
Yet in the US 90 per cent o f stored nuclear 
waste comes from the production and 
breakdown/recycling o f more than 30,000 
stockpiled nuclear weapons. And although 
power-generated waste will increase over the 
coming years, nuclear weapons production
— and therefore waste — continues to 
escalate.
The major concerns about the dangers o f 
nuclear power to the health and safety o f 
humanity, the unsolved waste disposal 
problem and the inadequacies o f safeguards 
against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
have yet to be answered by the pro-nuclear 
power lobby. And there is growing evidence 
that they cannot be satisfactorily answered, 
at least in the foreseeable future. For 
instance, a recent report from the US 
President’s Office o f Science and Technology 
Policy stressed that it will probably be at 
least 10 years before any of the suggested 
waste disposal methods can be tested 
sufficiently to warrant a decision in favour o f 
one form o f disposal over another. (14)
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The “ second nuclear age”  started when 
India exploded a nuclear device in 1974 (the 
first country in ten years to join the nuclear 
“ club” ).
In the first nuclear age, a country that wanted 
a bomb had to mount an expensive complex 
program. In the second nuclear age, a country 
acquires the capability to produce a nuclear 
weapon with relative ease — as a by-product of 
developing nuclear power. (15)
The US trained 1,100 Indian nuclear 
scientists and engineers prior to 1974 and 
provided the nuclear materials used to 
produce the Indian bomb, while Canada 
provided  the equipm ent and sp ecific  
technology — all in the name o f “ peaceful” 
nuclear energy.
The pro-nuclear power lobby used to argue 
that “ reactor grade” plutonium, useable as a 
fuel in a civilian reactor, was not o f sufficient 
quality to provide the material for an atomic 
bomb. But this was refuted last year by the 
US Energy Research and Development 
Administration (ERDA) who confirmed that 
at the Nevada test site, the US has exploded a 
n u c le a r  d e v ic e  u s in g  re a c to r -g r a d e  
plutonium obtained from a nuclear power 
plant. (16) All a country needs to utilise its 
uranium — U-235 — in the manufacture o f 
weapons is an uranium enrichment facility.
As SIPRI Director, Frank Barnaby, states:
The major problem in controlling the spread of 
nuclear weapons is that the fissile material for 
atomic bombs can be produced on a relatively 
small scale. A 40-megawatt electrical 
graphite-moderated, natural-uranium reactor, 
could, for example, produce about 20 
kilograms of plutonium-239 per year, more 
than enough for two 20-kiloton atomic bombs 
(e.g. Hiroshima-size).
The components for such a reactor could be 
easily and secretly obtained on the open 
market for a cost of less than $20 million. The 
reactor and a small chemical reprocessing 
unit to remove the plutonium from the reactor 
fuel elements could be clandestinely 
constructed and run. (17)
At the end o f 1976, Barnaby says, there 
were 173 power reactors in 19 countries, 
capable o f producing 16,000 kgms o f 
plutonium annually. About 30 per cent o f  this 
was in 15 non-nuclear countries Argentina, 
B e l g i u m ,  B u l g a r i a ,  C a n a d a ,  
Czechoslovakia, West Germany, the German
Democratic Republic, India, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, Pakistan, Spain, Sweden 
and Switzerland).
By the end o f 1980, about 250,000 kgms o f 
plutonium  w ill p rob ab ly  have been 
accumulated worldwide. Austria, Brazil, 
Finland, Hungary, Iran, South Korea, 
Taiwan and Yugoslavia will also then have 
nuclear power reactors.
By 1984, 28 non-nuclear weapon countries 
will probably have nuclear power reactors 
potentially able to produce about 30,000 
kgms annually — theoretically enough to 
produce ten 20-kilogram atom ic bombs each 
day.
How safe are the “ political barriers” to 
horizontal spread imposed by the 1968 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty? About 
100 countries have ratified the Treaty, 
thereby stating their intention not to produce 
n u c le a r  w e a p o n s .  H o w e v e r ,  th e  
overwhelming majority have no capacity to 
do so. And many near-nuclear countries have 
not ratified it, thus keeping their options 
open. Nor have India, France and China. 
The biggest loophole o f the Treaty is Article 
Ten, which says that any country can 
withdraw within three m onths’ notice if it 
deems this necessary in its own “ national 
interest” . Who can say how the fascist 
Pinochet, or Marcos o f the Philippines may 
interpret this?
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The nuclear industry is already beset by 
mounting political and econom ic problems. 
In country after cou n try  people are 
mobilising against nuclear power; and 
achieving significant victories. Last March 
the people o f conservative Kern County in 
California voted in a referendum 2 to 1 
against the siting o f a nuclear reactor in their 
area. The State’s energy policy now excludes 
new nuclear power stations. And on June 30 
a planned nuclear plant at Seabrook, New 
Hampshire, was suspended, following a 
20,000-strong anti-nuclear protest on June 3.
The fight against nuclear power can be 
won through continuing mass opposition 
and the effects o f the industry’s own inner 
con trad iction s. The A u stra lian  an ti­
uranium and peace movements have a 
particularly important role to play. The 
struggle to stop Australian uranium from 
being mined and exported is an important 
national struggle to protect Aboriginal land 
rights, the health  and sa fety  o f  all 
Australians, our environment, our civil 
liberties; and aga in st the continued 
multinational exploitation o f our resources. 
It also has vital international implications 
as a positive Australian contribution against 
the arms race and the spread o f nuclear 
weapons.
The anti-uranium movement has achieved 
a great deal already in its relatively short 
existence, including positive positions by 
sections of the trade union movement and 
the Labor Party. Above all, it has made 
uranium a public political issue and has 
mobilised hundreds jo f  thousands onto the 
streets in the b iggest m arches and 
d e m o n s tr a t io n s  s in c e  th e  V ie tn a m  
Moratorium. Providing this can be built on 
and the movement developed by greater 
involvement o f rank-and-file workers and 
greater unity between the labour, peace and 
anti-uranium movements, together with 
environmentalists and others, the Fraser 
Government and the pro-nuclear lobby can 
be defeated.
A  key aspect o f  stren gth en in g  the 
movement is to increase realisation that the 
struggle against nuclear power and nuclear 
weapons cannot be separated; that the 
struggle to keep uranium in the ground is 
also a struggle against the nuclear arms race 
and for disarmament.
This rea lisation  is g rad u a lly  being 
translated into united activities and a
coming together o f the anti-nuclear power 
and the a n ti-w ar/p eace  m ovem ents 
internationally.
At the Australian People’s Disarmament 
Conference held in Sydney and Melbourne in 
April this year organised by the Australian 
Peace Liaison Committee, many speakers 
stressed the need to develop these links, 
including Joe Camilleri from Melbourne, 
Terry Provance from the USA and Sheila 
Oakes from Britain. At the Hiroshima Day 
Rallies, visiting American biologist and anti- 
nuclear activist, Professor George Wald, 
pointed to the urgency o f developing unity 
among all anti-nuclear activists, to force not 
only an end to uranium mining, but an end to 
the n u c le a r  arm s ra ce  le a d in g  to 
disarmament.
As mentioned earlier, some sections o f the 
peace movement accept nuclear power which 
they maintain can be used safely for peaceful 
purposes, g iven  adequate safegu ards 
against nuclear weapons proliferation. This 
attitude has led to som e d ifferen ces 
internationally and in Australia. The World 
Peace Council was for many years the 
principal body uniting peace movements 
throughout the world. However, recently 
many peace activists have become concerned 
at a tendency to think that all activities and 
movements should be directed by, or 
channelled through, one international body.
The World Peace Council’s attitude 
towards nuclear power, expressed in Sydney 
recently by its President, Romesh Chandra 
(and in its journal New Perspectives 3/78), 
has led to a contradiction between its 
position and the most significant mass 
movement in the capitalist countries since 
the Viet Nam protests. And this is reflected 
among members o f its Australian branch, 
the Australian Peace Committee. If the 
movement here is to achieve the potential 
for developing into a much larger mass 
movement, involving all those working for a 
non-nuclear world, one essential point is that 
no one organisation or ideology can attempt 
to attain a monopolistic position, and that 
the movement is able to reach many more 
people through unity around the common 
goal.
If the struggle against uranium mining in 
Australia were achieved tomorrow, the vital 
problem o f the nuclear arms race and 
disarmament would still be confronting 
humanity. An urgent task is to deepen the
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understanding o f anti-uranium activists 
about the wider dangers o f nuclear power 
and the present nuclear arms race, by 
continuing to project these issues and 
developing closer unity between the peace 
and anti-uranium movements.
For the arms race and disarmament to 
become relevant political issues ir> thp 
A ustralian  context, the very word 
“disarmament” must be translated into 
identifiable goals and campaigns relevant to 
A ustralia . The fee lin g  am ong m any 
socialists that disarmament is not possible 
this side o f world socialism must also be 
combatted. If one accepted that, one might as 
well sit back with arms folded and wait for 
w hatever d isaster m ight befa ll. It is 
tantamount to saying that nothing can be 
done to curb world imperialism and that 
national liberation struggles or the class 
conflict against capitalism aren’t winnable, 
so why bother.
I would suggest that campaigns with the 
potential to involve large numbers o f people 
can be developed around the following issues 
in particular:
* An end to U .S. bases in Australia:
Such a campaign would expose the real 
nature o f the bases and the danger to 
Australia in the event o f a nuclear conflict; 
their vital role in the American nuclear 
network, particularly as part o f a first strike 
strategy; their control by the CIA and the 
complete lack of any Australian control or 
even knowledge o f their functions. Getting 
rid o f the US bases would be a tremendous 
contribution towards disarmament and 
would have far-reaching international 
effects.
* Nuclear-free zones in the Pacific and 
Indian Oceans embodying the closure o f all 
military bases in the region; an end to 
nuclear testing in the region; an end to visits 
o f nuclear-powered ships in Australian ports 
and the deployment o f nuclear-powered 
submarines (such as Trident) in the two 
oceans.
* An independent and non-aligned 
Australian foreign policy embodying an 
end to our subservience to the dictates o f the 
US in particular, our military involvement in 
ASEAN, arms sales to Indonesia or any 
other nation for use in counter-insurgency, 
and a more enlightened, co-operative policy 
towards our South-East Asian neighbours.
* No mining and export o f uranium.
These are tan gib le  p o lit ica l issues 
involving struggle against the Fraser 
Government and being part o f the wider 
struggle against imperialism. The tasks 
seem immense: but so is the struggle for 
s o c ia l is m  a g a in s t  c a p it a l is m  and 
im peria lism . The h ardest obstacle  to 
overcome is people’s feeling o f helplessness 
in the face of the nuclear arms race. But we 
must overcome it and develop mass action 
built on the understanding that the only 
force standing in the way o f nuclear 
holocaust is the power o f  people united in 
their common struggle.
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA
and
EUROCOMMUNISM
Marian Sling
Ten years ago the term Eurocommunism 
had yet to be invented, but in the spring o f 
1968 an attem pt w as being m ade in 
Czechoslovakia to apply m any o f the ideas, 
about the political, econom ic and social 
qualities o f a pluralist, democratic socialist 
society which have since been labelled as 
‘Eurocommunism The term Prague Spring 
then became, as Eurocommunism is today, a 
convenient and popular way o f ref erring to a 
particular trend in the search for a form of 
socialism suited to the needs o f a modem 
industrialised society.
The points o f departure are, o f course, 
different. For the Czechoslovaks it was a 
matter o f reforming and restructuring the 
‘existing socialism ’ which had been built up 
on the Soviet model, into a type o f society 
adapted to the needs and aspirations o f the 
people of Czechoslovakia — ‘socialism with a 
human face’ . That phrase caught the popular 
imagination because, for the Czechs and 
Slovaks, it meant rejection o f the inhuman 
stalinism they had experienced, and for the 
people in the capitalist world it offered the 
hope that socialism could, after all, provide a 
better future. The fact that the attempt was 
being made in the only country of Eastern 
Europe where an advanced political and 
industrial structure had already existed 
under cap ita lism  w as o f  particu lar 
significance in that connection.
As Santiago Carrillo has written in his 
book Eurocommunism and the State,
“ The case o f Czechoslovakia presented itself 
so sharply precisely because Czechoslovakia 
had reached the level o f France, for instance, 
and w hat em erged in  1968 was the 
contradiction between a society with a more 
developed cultural, economic and political 
infrastructure than the political and social 
system which was administering it.”  (1) In 
those words Carrillo has summed up what 
the Prague Spring was really about. And if 
we are to understand the full significance o f 
the events o f 1968, both for Czechoslovakia 
and for the international working class 
movement, we need to examine how the 
contradiction to which he refers arose, what 
were its effects and how the 1968 movement 
intended to tackle it. This requires a brief 
excursion into history.
Czechoslovakia, at its tormation in 1918, 
already possessed' a strong industrial base, 
an d  a t r a d it io n  o f  w o rk in g  c la s s  
organisation. It emerged as a bourgeois 
democracy, dominated by Czech finance 
capital, which relied on the West. For the 
C zechs and S lovaks, the tw o m ain 
nationalities in this small country, the idea 
o f  independent n ation h ood  was all- 
im portant a fter centuries o f  foreign  
domination, although the Slovaks, in the 
economically under-developed part o f the
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Republic, suffered both national and social 
oppression at the hands o f the Czech 
bourgeoisie, and tensions also existed with 
the various national minorities.
Karel Bartosek, one o f the marxist 
historians who, in the 1960s, were taking a 
new, undogmatic look at the modern history 
o f the country, has written that the pre-war 
Czechoslovak Republic represented the 
bourgeois solution o f  the national question 
and that the Czech bourgeoisie held a 
‘spiritual hegem ony’ in the new state, 
founded on the agreement o f the majority o f 
the people. The Communist Party with its 
internationalist tradition never succeeded in 
breaking that hegemony, although in the 
social field it could muster mass support 
against the ills o f capitalism. It was only 
when the country was faced with the threat 
o f German fascism that the revolutionary 
movement was able to appear convincingly 
as the champion o f the national interest 
and o f a new, democratic form o f state.
By then, however, it was too late. The 
bourgeois national state was destroyed not 
by the progressive forces, but by Hitler and 
internal reaction. The struggle between the 
bourgeois and the revolutionary solutions 
had not been resolved. During the German 
occu pation  from  1939-1945, how ever, 
national combined with social oppression 
unified the resistance movement, extending 
its demands beyond the main objective o f 
liberation from the Nazis to include the 
demand for a new democratic order when 
victory was won. The resistance brought 
together workers, peasants, urban petty 
bourgeois, ‘ordinary people’ everywhere, 
whereas open support for the Nazi occupiers 
came from sections o f  the former ruling class
— the top civil servants, large landowners 
and finance capitalists — bringing about a 
new polarisation o f  the population. The 
people were determined that the catastrophe 
o f Munich and the German occupation 
should never be repeated, and given the 
geographical position o f  the country, the 
entry o f the Soviet Union into the war was a 
strong influence in deciding the national 
outlook and the nature of the anti-fascist 
movement. There was, as one writer has put 
it, a ‘popular anti-fascism’, not explicitly 
socialist in all cases, but comparable to the 
‘popular radicalism ’ existing in war-time 
Britain.
The communists were the main force 
leading the anti-fascist resistance on the 
home front in the latter stages o f the war. The 
b o u r g e o is -d e m o c r a t ic , n a t io n a l is t ic  
opposition to fascism, on the other hand, 
although it operated mainly from abroad, 
commanded considerable support within the 
country and was still a force to be reckoned 
with. But when the military situation left no 
doubt that Soviet, not Western forces would 
liberate the greater part o f  the country, the 
leaders o f  the ‘n a tion a l b ou rg eo is ie ’ , 
President Benes, and his government in 
London, had to abandon the idea o f simply 
transferring themselves back to Prague to 
install some kind o f improved version o f the 
pre-war order. So they went to Moscow early 
in 1945 to negotiate with the communist 
leadership.
The struggle to decide the character o f the 
new Czechoslovakia now entered its decisive 
phase. Previous accounts o f the period 
leading up to the formation o f the 1945 
coalition government and the establishment 
o f ‘People’s Democracy’ have either seen it 
all as dominated by orders from Stalin and 
the decisions taken by the war-time alliance 
at Y alta, backed by the presence o f the Soviet 
Army (socialism brought in on bayonets 
being the crudest version); or at the other 
extreme there is the orthodox communist 
version that magnifies the strength o f the 
communists in the resistance and insists 
that by their wise policies the Moscow 
leadership was able to impose its will on the 
bourgeois politicians.
These versions reduce everything to a fight 
for power, with little reference to past history 
or the balance o f forces as it developed 
among the people o f the country during the 
w a r .  W h e n , h o w e v e r ,  w e  view 
Czechoslovakia’s post-war revolution as 
Bartosek and like-minded historians do, that 
is, as a process in which the bourgeois and 
revolutionary forces are still contending for 
‘spiritual hegemony’ o f the nation, we can 
begin to understand the significance not 
only o f Czechoslovakia’s ‘special road to 
socialism ’ from 1945-48, but also the reasons 
for the great popular upsurge o f the Prague 
Spring. Moreover, there are, as we shall see, 
aspects o f this post-war development which 
have considerable relevance to the problems 
o f ‘Eurocommunism’.
Whatever the differences in the specific 
circumstances, Czechoslovakia in 1945 was,
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as are Italy, Spain, Portugal today, a country 
in crisis — political, social, econom ic and 
moral — where the issue o f  bourgeois or 
w orking class hegem ony w as still to be 
d e c id e d , w h ere  la rg e  s e c t io n s  o f  the 
population were aware o f  the need for 
stru ctu ra l ch a n g e , a n d  a lo n g s id e  the 
revolutionary vanguard there was a mass 
desire for radical, i f  not outright socialist 
policies; at the sam e time, the forces o f  the 
right, nationalistic, capitalist and religious, 
m aintained som e hold within the country 
and could receive support from  abroad.
H ow , th en , d id  the le ft m ovem en t, 
prim arily the C om m unist Party, handle the 
situation? First, it should be borne in mind 
that the presence o f  the Soviet A rm y was a 
very powerful factor, not only in term s o f 
power politics, but also in in fluencing public 
opinion. Bartosek notes that there was really 
very little interference by the Soviet forces in 
the internal affa irs o f  the country, and for the 
‘ interference’ in fighting and driv ing  out the 
Nazis the people were infinitely grateful. 
And this had been done by a socialist power.
The situation at the end o f  the war was, 
then, very favorable for (he w orking class 
movement to play a leading part in deciding 
the future. At the negotiations in M oscow , 
a n d  l a t e r  in S l o v a k i a ,  b e t w e e n  
representatives o f  the national bourgeoisie 
and the socialists and com m unists, the only 
coherent program  for a post-war govern  men! 
was put forward by the C om m unist Party. 
Bv providing for a multi-party coalition  and 
being restricted to short-term measures, the 
program offered the basis for agreem ent. The 
unifying objective was to defeat the Nazis — 
it was an anti-fascist program . The new 
rgeirne would not be the pre-M unich regime, 
it would be a people ’s dem ocracy  relying on 
new dem ocratic institutions. The property o f 
Nazi.-' and their collaborators would be 
confiscated, thereby en croach ing  on the 
capitalist structure. A new approach  to the 
national question recognised S lovak ia ’s 
equal status. The m ainstay o f  foreign policy 
would be a lliance with the Soviet Union. 
P en d in g  e le c t io n s  to a C on stitu en t 
A ssem bly, the political parties had equal 
representation in the governm ent. The key 
posts in this interim governm ent were given 
to com m unists and non-party specialists.
Bartosek describes the solution as a 
com prom ise between the com m unist and the 
Benes positions — it w as both anti-fascist
and nationalist, with the em phasis on the 
first. The balance o f  forces inclined to the 
side o f  the w orking class; the basis for an 
anti-capitalist revolution existed, but it 
would be a new type o f revolution, differing 
from the Russian. “The new ness” , he writes, 
‘was not, however, in the tem porary co­
operation with a section o f the bourgeoisie 
which the balance o f  forces im posed, it was 
in the structure o f  the revolutionary front o f  
workers, born in the fight against fascism , in 
which there were not on ly workers and a 
section o f  the farm ers, but also the urban 
m i d d l e  c l a s s e s ,  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  
adm inistrative and industrial apparatus 
and o f  the creative intelligentsia” . This anti­
fa sc is t  u n ity  o ffe red  a g re a t  h is to r ic  
opportunity to carry out socialist change by 
p ea ce fu l d e m o cra tic  m ean s wi th  the 
support o f  the m ajority o f  society.
So, as long ago as 1944-1.), long before the 
ideas o f  ‘ E urocom m unism ' or the Prague
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Spring had emerged, Czechoslovakia was 
poised to put into practice what appear to be 
very similar ideas.
The international situation played a big 
part here. The policy o f a national and 
democratic revolution supported by the 
national bourgeoisie , on w hich the 
communist approach was based at the time, 
was in accordance with Stalin's belief that it 
would be possible to continue the anti-Hitler 
coa lition  into the post-w ar period o f  
reconstruction. And agreement could be 
reached with the national bourgeoisie 
because Benes and his Czech Socialist Party, 
while adhering finnly to the system of 
parliamentary democracy, had already 
spoken during the war years about the 
nationalising of the key industries and 
introducing some measure o f economic 
p lan n in g . On foreign  po licy  all the 
negotiating parties were aware o f the 
inevitability o f accepting the Soviet power 
‘umbrella’ .
The coalition program was not a socialist 
program, and the communists were the most 
cautious about speaking o f socialism as an 
exp licit aim . Their leader, K lem ent 
Gottwald, defined the relationship within 
the coalition as follows: “ We cannot rule 
ourselves and they cannot rule alone. They 
cannot rule without us and we cannot rule 
without them. At the same time they less 
without us than we without them. What 
remains is to co-operate with the other 
political group which is forced to co-operate 
with us.”  (2) After the liberation in 1945, 
however, there was strong popular demand 
for rad ica l policies, particu larly  for 
nationalisation measures going beyond the 
provisions o f the program for taking over all 
com panies owned by G erm ans and 
collaborators, or where such people had sat 
on the boards o f management (which, in fact, 
took in thv. key industrial concerns, mines, 
finance and banking). Similarly, the land 
reform started with the confiscation o f land 
belonging to enemies and traitors, thereby 
breaking up the big estates and increasing 
the numbers o f small and middle farmers. 
The Communist Party was careful to present 
t h e s e  m e a s u r e s ,  a s  w e ll  a s  th e  
democratisation o f public life through local 
councils, works councils and workers’ 
representation on the management boards o f 
nationalised concerns, as part of the 
national and democratic revolution, not as
socialism but as ‘people’s democracy’. 
Economic planning, embodied in the Two 
Year Plan for Postwar Reconstruction, was 
also part o f this concept.
In 1946 the communists emerged from free 
elections with 38 per cent o f the vote, making 
them the largest single party. In this period, 
by their cautious policy, they won a 
commanding position as the party most 
determinedly working for the national 
interest. And a socio-economic formation 
had been estab lished  w hich  could, 
potentially, have developed into a new, 
democratic and non-Soviet type o f socialist 
society. There was a three-sector economy, 
nationalised, co-operative and private, 
managed by a combination o f planning and 
the m arket, a m ulti-party coa lition  
government, strong, united and independent 
trade unions, industrial democracy through 
works councils, a farm ing community 
favorably inclined to the agricultural 
policies, a high degree o f civil rights and 
freedoms, and, in foreign relations, no 
conflict with the Soviet Union which had 
withdrawn its troops from the country by the 
end of 1945. The society was strongly non­
capitalist in character, with only 5.8 per cent 
o f  the national incom e go in g  to the 
capitalists and estate owners at the close of 
1947.
The question whether or not this was a 
‘special road to socialism ’ , especially 
whether it was genuinely viewed as such by 
the Communist Party o f the day, has been 
much discussed. The dogmatic thinking 
which dominated Czechoslovak work on the 
period after 1948 clouded the issue for some 
time, but in the 1960s during the run up to the 
Prague Spring many writers took a new look 
at the experience. The term special road was 
certainly used at the time, even by Stalin (for 
instance, in an interview with British Labor 
MPs in 1946), and Klement Gottwald used it, 
too, as a road not via “ the dictatorship o f the 
proletariat and soviets” ; it would be a 
“ longer and more complicated road .... ” , but 
without bloodshed. But did the communists 
o f the day envisage a type o f socialism at the 
end o f the road differing from the Soviet 
model? The answer to this is not clear and, in 
any event, the crisis o f 1948 decided the 
matter otherwise.
This is not the place to discuss the nature of 
the events o f February 1948 which put a stop
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to C zechoslovakia ’s first venture towards 
dem ocratic socialism , except perhaps to say 
that, as so often in the country ’s history, 
international factors, in the shape o f the cold 
war, played a large part. The stali.nist regime 
was im posed and, with tragic consequences, 
held the country in its grip until 1968.
The experience o f  1945-48 was not lost, 
however. As M ichal Reim an, one o f  the 
younger generation o f  m arxist historians 
has written, despite all the shortcom ings and 
conflicts, and the incom pleteness, this 
alternative road can be seen “ as a distant 
prototype for som e o f  the considerations 
about the nature o f  a socia list order grow ing 
out o f  a peaceful revolution w hich now find a 
developed form  in m any o f  the conclusions o f 
fraternal parties in the W est” .
For those in C zechoslovakia  who were 
seeking a w ay out o f  the stultifying 
conditions o f N ovotny ’s neo-stalinist regimu, 
the days o f  the ‘special roa d ’ also served as a 
source. For the people at large those days 
tended to appear as ‘the good old days ’ , 
rather glorified in retrospect as, even more so 
for m any, were the years o f  the pre-war 
bourgeois Republic. Im portant, however, in
this respect w as the elem ent o f  continuity in 
the national history o f  the Czechs and 
Slovaks w hich had been broken by the 
im position o f  an alien system o f  society. The 
struggle for ‘spiritual hegem ony ’ remained 
to be resolved, but, as the Prague Spring was 
to dem onstrate am azingly, despite all that 
h ad  h a p p e n e d , the fo rce s  o f  gen u in e  
socialism  were trium phant and would have 
remained so i f  the Soviet U nion had not 
intervened.
The C zechoslovak m arxists who prepared, 
at least to som e extent, the theoretical basis 
for 1968 were able to assess in a more sober 
way than the public at large the experience o f 
the first post-w ar years, and they were also to 
pick up the threads o f  a trend existing in their 
own party from  its foundation. Carrillo has 
pointed out that ‘E urocom m unism ’ has its 
roots  fa r  b a ck  in the h is to ry  o f  the 
c o m m u n i s t  m o v e m e n t ,  a n d  t h e  
C zechoslovak Party can claim  its part in 
this. A  leading figure from 1921, when the 
C om m unist Party won over the m ajority o f  
the Social D em ocratic Party, was the 
e x p e r ie n ce d  A u stro -M a rx is t  R oh u m il 
Smeral, w hose concept o f a dem ocratic 
workers’ governm ent was an attem pt to find
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a road to socialism suited to a West European 
type o f society. Although ‘Smeralism’ was 
anathematised after Lenin’s death as a 
rightwing deviation, the trend was not 
entirely suppressed. It cropped up again in
1934 in opposition to the sectarian policy of 
the Comintern, only to be rejected, although 
in face o f the fascist threat the Popular Fron t 
policy was adopted soon after, in 1935. 
Smeral was the first o f the Czechoslovak 
communists to formulate in 1939 to 1941 (he 
died in Moscow in 1941) the concept o f a 
democratic anti-fascist revolution and an 
anti-fascist national front as a possible 
starting point for democratic socialist 
advance after the war. In the resistance 
movement, too, there were groups and 
ind iv idu als who v isualised  post-w ar 
development along similar lines. In brieLone 
may say that although in its pre-war history 
the CPC was as subordinated as any other 
communist party to the dictates o f the 
Comintern, it carried within it the germs o f a 
more independent national trend which was 
never.quite extinguished.
When, after the election o f Alexander I)ubcek 
to the leadership o f the Communist Party in 
January 1968, the need for a program was 
urgently posed, there was, as we have seen, 
valuable experience to draw upon. Those 
who were studying these matters during the 
1960s were, o f course, also familiar with the 
works o f Gramsciv Togliatti and other 
creative marxist thinkers, and they produced 
some original works which provided a 
theoretical basis for the Action Program o f 
the Communist Party o f Czechoslovakia, 
published in April 1968. We may mention 
particularly the work o f an ‘interdisciplinary 
team’ headed by Radovan Richta and 
published under the title Civilisation at the 
Crossroads (3) which was, in its day, a 
unique attempt to tackle the problems of 
‘post-industrial society’ from a marxist 
standpoint, with special attention to the 
changes in the political, economic and social 
sp h e re s  w h ich  the s c ie n t i f ic  and  
technological revolution could and should 
bring about in a socialist Czechoslovakia.
Another team headed by Zdenek Mlynar, 
studied the political system o f socialism, and 
its book, The State and Society, inspired 
many o f the proposals for changing the 
political system in the direction of socialist 
democracy that are contained in the Action 
Program. The stifling o f these and other
critical and exploratory undertakings by 
Czechoslovak marxists which took place 
from 1969 onwards is a sad loss for creative 
marxism.
Essentially the Action Program was 
concerned with the first steps towards 
resolving the contradiction between the type 
o f society and the political and social system 
which was administering it, to which 
Carrillo referred. It was, as its name implies, 
a short-term program designed primarily to 
free the political and econom ic system from 
the worst aspects o f the old regime — to end 
censorship, to make the ruling party earn its 
‘leading role’ by reason not coercion, to make 
the trade unions and other organisations of 
the people independent o f party control, to 
introduce industrial democracy and to free 
the economy from the system o f rigid 
command planning. The program was not, 
therefore, a b lue-print for the future 
democratic socialist order, and questions 
such as the formation o f opposition parties 
(which has been the subject o f criticism from 
some quarters) had still to be resolved. 
Nevertheless, Czechoslovakia’s Action 
Program was studied with lively interest by 
the socialist and communist parties in many 
countries because, in its underly ing 
assumptions, it was in line with the thinking 
o f those in the international communist 
movement who were, particularly since 1956, 
seeking an image o f socialism differing from 
the distorted Soviet model. Many o f these 
aims are summed up in a sentence from the 
program: “ Socialism cannot mean only 
liberation of the working people from the 
domination o f exploiting class relations, but 
must make more provisions for a fuller life of 
the person ality  than any bourgeois 
democracy.”
For the other countries o f  Eastern Europe 
this approach and the events o f the Prague 
Spring were o f revolutionary significance — 
for thinking people in all walks of life, 
workers and in tellectu a ls alike, they 
accorded with their own experience and 
aspirations (for instance, the experiences of 
Poland and Hungary in 1956 and later), for 
the leaders they represented a threat to the 
monopoly o f power. And it was, o f course, 
essentially that sense o f danger that led to 
the invasion o f August 1968 which was 
carefully timed to prevent the holding o f the 
Czechoslovak Party Congress at which the 
provisions of the Action Program would
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have been further developed in the direction 
o f socialist democracy.
For communist parties in the capitalist 
world, insofar as they were not so hide-bound 
by dogma as to support the ‘ fraternal aid' 
afforded to Czechoslovakia by the invading 
forces, the Prague Spring was, and remains, 
a source o f inspiration, while the shock of its 
crushing provided a stimulus for those 
seeking, or already starting to tread, their 
own roads to socialism. For the Spanish 
Party, writes S an tiago  C arrillo , “ the 
c u lm in a t in g  p o in t in w in n in g  ou r 
independence (from Moscow — M.S.) was the 
occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1988” . (4) 
An Italian  view is g iven  by G iorgi 
Napolitano: “ Other facts arose (above all the 
e v e n ts  o f  C z e c h o s lo v a k ia )  w h ich  
dramatically forced on the PCI leadership 
the need to deepen and develop even further 
their own vision of socialism, o f the 
rela tion sh ip  between dem ocracy  and 
socialism, of the problems o f the socialist 
world and of the world wide revolutionary 
workers’ movement.”  (5)
In the ten years since August 1968 much 
has happened to advance the trends loosely 
described as ‘Eurocommunist’ — we have 
seen progress and setbacks in various 
countries of the capitalist West, while in 
Eastern Europe, too, there have been 
s t ir r in g s  (e .g . P o la n d  1970, e tc .) . 
Czechoslovakia has been ‘normalised’ , that 
is, an even more repressive system than 
existed in the 1960s has been imposed upon 
her in the name o f ‘saving socialism ’ . Rut the 
unresolved conflict remains, the tensions 
and frustrations are even greater and 
socialism is in even greater crisis than 
before. Yet the regime refuses to listen to the 
warnings issued by the signatories of 
Charter 77 that their course can only lead to 
catastrophe.
One lesson to be learnt from the history o f 
Czechoslovakia is that any attempt to force a 
society into a mould that is alien to it is 
bound to fail sooner or later, even when that 
mould is socialist in name. The experience o f 
the ‘special road’ in 1945-48 and again, in a 
new form, o f the Prague Spring,also refutes 
the argument that although there may be 
peaceful roads to socialism, the ultimate goal 
can only be one kind of socialism, the Soviet 
type — an argument used today by those who 
insist that ‘Eurocommunism’ is merely a 
tactic for arriving at the same goal.
And finally, the lesson for the countries o f 
the Eastern bloc is, as has been proved over 
and over again in Poland, Hungary and 
elsewhere, that one country cannot go it 
alone in breaking with the old order. Though 
their paths may differ in some respects and 
the solutions they seek will be adapted to the 
specia l needs o f  their countries, the 
progressive movements will have to act in 
some wav in concert. At present we can 
expect no more than exchanges o f ideas 
among the ‘dissident’ groups, and reports of 
a meeting between Czechoslovak spokes­
persons for Charter 77 and members o f the 
Polish Committee for Social Self Defence on 
the tenth anniversary o f August 1968 are an 
indication o f what may be happening.
As far as Czechoslovakia is concerned, one 
thing is certain — a movement o f the Prague 
Spring type can never be repeated. 
After the purging o f the Communist Party, 
the deeds carried out in its name against the 
C z e c h o s l o v a k  p e o p l e ,  a n d  th e  
disillusionment among many sections o f the 
p o p u la t io n  w ith  a n y th in g  term ed  
communist, or even socialist, an advance 
cannot come from within the party again. 
Although in its crude sense a ‘return to 
capitalism’ is unlikely to be envisaged by 
any hut the most rabid anti-socialists (to 
return the means o f production to capitalist 
ownership does not come into consideration), 
it must be said that the old struggle for 
‘spiritual hegemony’ will have to be fought 
out anew. In that process people will 
undoubtedly turn again for inspiration to
1968. And socialists and communists in 
other countries can help enormously both by 
studying and developing the ideas o f 1968 
and, above all, by showing their solidarity 
with the groups in Eastern Europe which are 
seeking a new socialist solution for their 
countries.
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THE SANYO 
WORK IN
In July this year , workers occupied the Sanyo factory in Wodonga in p rotest at. 
retrenchments by the company.
The following interview with a woman shop steward was conducted during the 
occupation in the canteen where the workers slept at night.
It explains the background to the work-in and how the originally conservative 
workers developed their own understanding o f the need for the work-in and o f the 
importance o f  unions.
I understand there have been re trenchm ents  
since O ctober 1 9 7 7  w hen there w ere  7 9  
retrenched, fo llow ed  by 3 0  in N ovem ber and 
4 5  in F e b ru a ry  1 9 7 8 .  D u rin g  th o s e  
retrenchm ents there seem ed to be very little  
response fro m  the w orkers. Suddenly w e  
have fro n t-p ag e  headlines, the w orkers  
producing leaflets explaining their position, 
occupying the canteen. W h at happened in the  
m eantim e, w h a t's  happened to the w orkers?
Well, basically, the first couple o f lots o f 
retrenchments were accepted on the basis 
that, if they took some, it would ensure the 
security o f the jobs o f  the people still in 
employment in the plant. After the second lot 
o f retrenchments, the plant manager said 
there would be no more. If there was, he 
would be the first to go. That made people feel 
a little more secure.
However, just after Xmas retrenchment 
rum ors started circu la tin g  again . In 
February, with no notice to the unions, just 
completely out o f the blue one afternoon just 
b e fo re  k n o c k -o f f  t im e , th ey  se rv e d  
retrenchment notices on 45 people. This was 
done the very same day that management 
was meeting in Melbourne with union 
officials to ask them for help regarding the 
tarift iu it io n .
Had the union o ffic ials been in form ed about 
the intended retrenchm ents?
No. When I was in form ed  o f  the 
retrenchments, I immediately contacted 
Charlie Faure, Victorian Electrical Trades 
Union secretary. That was the first he had 
heard o f it. At that stage it was about 4 p.m. 
and the only organiser in the district was 
Richard Young from SPU. We contacted him 
and when he arrived most o f the employees 
had gone. We had a bit o f trouble getting 
Richard in.
You mean the com pany refused to  a llow  him  
in?
Yes, until he set them straight. What 
happened was there was nobody with any 
authority in the plant to give Richard 
permission to have access to the factory. 
They used that as an excuse to deny Richard 
access to the plant. The next day we had our 
organisers down from Melbourne. This was 
the third lot o f retrenchments. It was 
extremely badly handled right from start to 
finish. It just created so many hassles with 
the people and they’ve lived constantly with 
it ever since.
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W hat w as the feeling of people? H o w  w ere  
th e y  a f f e c t e d  by th is  t h ir d  lo t  o f  
retrenchm ents?
The employment situation had got worse. 
Mostly it meant to them that they had no job 
security. They lost that feeling o f security 
and had a constant fear o f  being retrenched. 
Every pay day they sort o f wondered - is this 
the week I’m going to get a retrenchment 
notice?
So, until the th ird lot of re trenchm ents, the  
4 5  people w ho  w ere  retrenched in February  
1 9 7 8 , people in the factory had not been so 
co n sc io u s  o f th e  p o s s ib ility  o f being  
retrenched, they h adn 't been so fearfu l of it. 
But a fte r this lo t of retrenchm ents their 
attitude changed?
Yes, dramatically..I think after the second 
lot they sort o f thought it’s right now, 
everything's going to be OK, and they put a 
lot o f faith in company reassurances which 
are given fairly frequently, or were. About 
the time o f the third lot o f retrenchments, 
things started going rapidly downhill. Over 
the past few months they’ve had an 
increasing pressure o f worry about their jobs 
from week to week. Just one instance comes 
to mind fairly strongly. Three or four weeks 
ago the Wodonga Credit Union distributed 
pamphlets which were in a white envelope, 
and stapled to the pay envelopes.. It was so 
distressing for some people that when the 
leading hand went to hand them their pay, 
they either burst into tears, refused to take it, 
or stood back and said, “ No, tell me what’s in 
it first ", That sort of attitude was created 
simply through fear for their jobs. For two 
months at least there've been solid rumors 
going around that there were going to be 
retrenchments at the end o f June.
A t that tim e did you notice any change in their 
attitude? Did they becom e angrier at the  
situation.
Yes, and I'll tell you why. Every week 
virtually, for two months, the shop stewards 
h ad  a m eetin g  o n ce  a w eek w ith  
management and every week we kept asking 
them, “ Is there going to be any more, if there 
is we want to know” . Every week, even up to 
as late as two weeks ago, we were given really 
strong denials.
The workers have been issuing statements 
for quite a few weeks now. If there’s going to 
be more retrenchments, they’re not going to 
get awav with it again. This time we’re going 
to stand and light because if they get away 
with it this time, it’s going to happen again 
and again, and there's not going to be 
anyone left at Sanyo, just a skeleton staff. 
What, in fact, it means is thatthey are slowly 
but surely cutting the workforce down a few 
at a time.
This was the so .t of thing th a t people w ere  
discussing in their lunch hour?
Yes. sure. On the lines, in their lunch hour. 
They’ve had plenty o f time to do it. Some of 
them have had quite a bit o f spare time and 
they’ve been saying this for weeks and 
weeks.
Right. So now  w e com e to the present 
situation. Can you tel! me briefly w h a t 
happened last w eek and w h a t led to  this 
situation of w orkers occupying the canteen  
as w e can see them  around us here tonight?
Well, two weeks ago, the union organisers 
were asked by the company to come down 
and sort out a possible demarcation problem. 
They came down and found that, at that 
stage, they were unable to do anything. They 
agreed that they’d come back in a month or 
so when things were actually set up and sort 
it out to their satisfaction. However, while 
they were down here the shop steward from 
the cabinet factory approached his organiser 
and said he'd had a problem for quite a few 
months and could Peter give him a hand with 
it. So Peter stayed over the next day to help 
him sort it out. This resulted in them putting 
a ban on some machinery and, subsequently, 
in a strike.
How  long did the strike last?
Only the Friday and Monday. However, on 
the Friday afternoon they started standing 
down people from up here.
S o th e s tr ik e h a d o n ly b e e n g o in g fo ro n e d a y ?
It hadn’t even been going for a day, only a 
matter o f hours, when they started standing 
down ETU people.
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W hy did they say they w ere standing them  
down?
Because they were running out o f boards, 
casings, wraps, things like that. Oh the 
Monday all the organisers came down again 
and we entered into fa irly  lengthy 
discussions and it was settled on the Monday 
afternoon. However, by that stage a similar 
situation had cropped up that caused the 
storemen and packers to go out. This meant 
that we were still stood down because we 
were still unable to work.
These w ere  essentially m inor grievances?
They were very minor grievances and it 
didn’t really mean very much at all because 
they were both settled within a day or so. 
However, on the Tuesday we were issued 
with the statement that on Thursday 
retrenchment notices would be handed out 
and on the Friday the people would be 
retrenched.
A nd th e  c o m p a n y  c la im e d  th a t  th e  
re trenchm ents w ere  brought on by the fac t 
th a t there 'd  been som e lim ited strike action?
Yes, that’s exactly right. They claimed 
that the strike action was responsible for it. 
However, it’s the opinion o f all the workers 
h ere , m vs e l f  in c lu d e d , th at th o se  
retrenchment lists had been drawn up quite 
some weeks beforehand. The actions o f the 
other two unions were very minor and people 
here feel the company only used that as the 
wedge to drive between the ETU and the 
other two unions. They were trying to divide 
the ETU o ff from the other two unions 
because it weakens them if they’re a more 
divided group.
W hy d id n 't the com pany's strategy work?
Well, basically, they just completely 
underestimated the workforce. The people 
here are just so fed up with the garbage that 
comes out o f the office — their constant lies. 
They weren’t ready to cop it. They just said 
‘no, we’re not going to cop it’. ‘Let’s all get 
together, keep together, then at least we have 
a hope o f winning it.’
Follow ing th a t there w as a co m m ittee  
formed?
Yes, that’s right. The committee is calling 
itself the Sanyo Workers’ Committee for 
Continued Employment.
The co m m ittee , as I understand it, cam e up 
w ith  som e recom m endations to the rest of 
the m em bers o f all the unions. There w as a 
com bined unions com m ittee?
Yes, there was a com bin ed  unions 
committee and it comprised the shop 
stewards plus about seven or eight rank and 
file members from various unions. Each 
union was represented.
So rank and file  m em bers constitu ted  a 
m ajority  on the com m ittee?
Yes, about two to one.
W hat w ere  the main elem ents of the  
recom m endations put to the w orkers, and the 
position adopted by the w orkers?
Well, the committee had a good hard look 
at it and discussed several things, but the 
only answer we could seem to come up with 
was that strike action was o f no benefit to us. 
We had to try something which was 
completely different and catch the company 
completely o ff  guard. We had a think about it 
and came up with the idea that we would 
have a work-in. We w>uld man the 
production lines during the day and occupy 
the canteen during ;i 'i “ r work hours.
Do you rem em ber w nere this idea for the 
w o rk - in  cam e fro m , o r d id  it arise  
spontaneously?
It’s just one o f those things where you’re 
sitting there and suddenly you say, ‘Well, 
damn it. I don't sec why we should be 
retrenched. Just refuse to leave. VV«* won't go. 
We won’t accept it.' It's like Topsy it just 
grew.
It g rew  from  the basic idea th a t you w ere  
going to  refuse to be retrenched and the  
strategy w as built around th a t idea?
Yes.
W hat w ere the elem ents of th a t strategy?  
W hat did you hope to achieve by w orking  in?
Well, a couple o f things. Firstly, o f course, 
we re seeking to keep the jobs o f those people 
that were to he retrenched. The other one was
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that we need to have some job security. To 
obtain the job security we have to force the 
company to agree to give some sort o f 
guarantee that they’re not going to sack us 
next week or the week after. Now, to achieve 
these things we also had to look at the 
broader issues. We realise that the company 
has a problem because o f the tariff levels on 
television sets imported into Australia. 
Admittedly, some o f these are Sanyo sets 
which are imported from Japan and they’re 
causing us a great deal o f damage because we 
can’t compete with those markets. So, to 
draw the attention o f the government and 
people o f Australia, and anybody else that’s 
o f any help, we decided it had to be 
something completely different, because we 
must get something done about those tariff 
levels.
So you decided on a co m plete ly  new  strategy, 
trying to gain governm ent assistance for 
m aintain ing jobs a t the sam e tim e  as try in g  to  
force the com pany into backing dow n on the  
im m ediate retrenchm ents. W hen you put 
these recom m endations to  the people  
w orking  here, w ere  you co n fid en t th a t they  
w ould all go along w ith  them ?
I must admit it seemed such a wild idea 
that when I came in here on Wednesday 
m o rn in g  and  we pu t fo rw a rd  the 
recommendations of the committee I wasn’t 
terribly confident we’d get them to agree to it. 
When we put it forward we got almost a one 
hundred per cent majority and I was 
absolutely staggered by the response from 
the workers.
So everyone agreed to w o rk  in. W hat 
happened then?
Straight after work in the afternoon, a 
group o f people stayed here while the other 
group zipped home to get sleeping gear and 
organise food, because there were two 
problems which we had to get straight. When 
the first lot came back, the second lot did the 
same thing. So that in a very short time we 
had ourselves relatively well organised.
So the strategy to  w ork in in the d aytim e and 
occupy at n ight has been happening since last 
W ednesday?
Yes. 24 hours a day the canteen has been 
occupied.
And has w ork  continued?
It continued up until Friday morning when 
we had a temporary lock-out which the 
company claims was a misunderstanding. 
When we went in and approached them, they 
let us all back in. That was straight after we 
had the mass resignation. We manned the 
production lines on Monday taking with us 
the people who had received retrenchment 
notices on Friday. All those people were 
allowed to work the day out including the 
ones who had been retrenched. Very little 
happened on Monday.
Tuesday, which was yesterday, we arrived 
at work and spent the day sitting out here. 
On Monday, the company had made an 
agreement and a commitment to us that they 
would carry ten workers. When we got in on 
Tuesday they denied they had reached such 
an agreement. When we put this to our 
members they again unanimously agreed 
not to go back to work until such time as 
those people were allowed to go back to work, 
or we spoke to Mr. Jones or something more 
concrete.
Also they informed us they had contacted 
the Arbitration Commission. This morning 
people arrived ready to go to work to find 
themselves locked out o f the factory. So, 
unable to resume work, we went in and 
approached the management and said “ Do 
you know what’s going on?” They said they 
would open the factory if the production lines 
were manned normally, the people that were 
retrenched stayed in the canteen and no 
union organisers were in the factory. When 
we came back and put it to the people, they 
just said no. “ Tell them to forget it. We’re 
staying here. They’re not going to divide us. 
What they’re trying to do is divide the group 
again and we’re not going to have it. Either 
we all go back to work or none o f us do.” 
There was no recommendation put forward 
by anybody, we just told them exactly what 
the company had said and all o f a sudden, 
erupting from everywhere around the floor, 
were people with their comments making 
recom m endations and m aking m oves 
themselves.
That situation is quite am azing, especially for 
a conservative com m unity  like A lbury- 
W odonga w hich  doesn 't have a great history  
of industrial d isputation. I understand th a t in 
this p lant itself, attitudes tow ards unionism  
and union solidarity by the w orkers have not 
been very strong in the past?
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That’s perfectly true. In fact, I wrote an 
article for our union newspaper a couple o f 
years ago where I accused the workers here o f 
being the most apathetic lot o f people I had 
ever seen because o f  their lack o f interest in 
the unions and lack o f knowledge, which is 
not a hundred per cent their fault. On many 
occasions, I had people grizzling to me about 
having to be in the union and paying union 
fees.
Looking around us here, there are w orkers  
sitting a t tables, playing cards, w ritin g  letters, 
reading books, lying in beds w hich  they  
brought here. There's a general atm osphere  
of solidarity and friendship. W h at sort of 
effec t has th is strategy o f occupying the  
canteen rig ht through the n ight had on the  
w orkers here? I understand people are 
com m unicating  w ith  others fro m  d iffe ren t 
parts of the p lant now , w hereas before they  
d idn 't.
Well, the cabinet factory’s never had a 
close affinity with the people up here because 
o f being down the road a bit. Suddenly, all 
those people there are known to the people up 
here and lots o f friendships have been 
formed. Different areas in the factory used to 
keep to their own groups, sit at their own 
tables and not mix very well. Now, suddenly, 
they’re all one big group mixing together 
helping each other. Ones who can ’t come ir. 
at night are looking after the kids o f the ones 
who want to come in. We had tremendous 
support over the week-end when we had no 
power. A  lot o f people who couldn’t come in 
were making soup and casseroles and 
bringing gas lights, gas barbecues and 
things like that. I think it’s generally been 
very good from the union point o f view 
because it ’s made them understand their 
union a lot better.
I understand th ere 's  been a lot o f te legram s of 
support w h ich  have com e in from  other  
unions in Australia?
Yes. A  large number o f telegrams from a 
large number o f  unions, and also some 
women’s groups have come in and it’s been a 
tremendous morale booster for the people 
here because the very first lot o f  telegrams 
arrived when they were feeling a bit down.
Even though it’s sometimes a few words in 
a telegram it means a heck o f a lot to these 
people because they didn’t really understand 
that unions could have such close unity.
There d oesn 't seem to be m uch question in 
people's m inds as to  w h e th e r they can go 
w ith  it. They seem m ore relaxed than a few  
days ago. Even getting  som e satisfaction out 
of being here?
I think one thing that is quite noticeable, 
and is probably what you’re trying to 
explain, is that they’ve just got such sheer 
determination. No matter what, they’re 
going to stick it out until they get the result 
they’re after. I think it’s this determination 
that kept a lot o f them going because it’s not 
very easy for 40, sometimes 60, all in here 
together. We had problems sleeping for a 
couple o f nights. But we’ve overcome all 
those problems and nobody seems to be 
having any hassles. We’ve got the food thing 
running smoothly. At the week-end it was 
v ery  d i f f i c u l t  b e ca u s e  o f  the h ard  
circumstances, the cold, no power and 
everything, hut all that did was strengthen 
their determination and make them more 
united.
The am ount o f friendship, co-operation  and 
civilised behavior th a t's  going on here is quite  
trem endous to see. D o  you th ink this  
experience has changed anyone in th e ir own  
personal attitudes, the w ay  th ey  relate to  
other people?
Yes, for sure. We had people who were anti­
union and suddenly they realised why 
th ey ’re p ay in g  the un ion  fees. They 
understand helping each other. In fact, some 
are on our committee and they’re relating to 
the other workers. I think this is an 
experience that none o f us is ever going to 
forget. Also, it’s had a tremendous effect on 
the people because they know now that, no 
matter what, nobody is ever going to put 
anything over them again.
H o w  do you see the fu tu re  o f the solidarity of 
the w orkers in the W odonga factory? W h at do 
you see happening w hen industrial disputes  
occur in the future?
One thing I know is that the people here 
now understand that a union is only as 
strong as the members in it, and while they 
remain strong themselves then they have a 
pretty good chance o f licking whatever it is 
that’s the problem. I think this is fairly 
important because up until now they didn’t 
seem to realise this. This is one thing they 
have learnt and it’s valuable to them.
THE 
BUKHARIN 
AFFAIR
Earlier this year the joint secretaries of the 
Communist Party of Australia, Eric Aarons, Joe 
Palmada and Mavis Robertson, signed an appeal 
initiated by the Bertrand Russell Peace 
Foundation, addressed to the Soviet government. 
The appeal requests reopening of the case of 
Nikolai Bukharin, his rehabilitation, and a public 
explanation of the circumstances which led to his 
wrongful conviction.
The initial signatories include many well known 
communists, socialists, and social democrats from 
a dozen or more countries. Among them are: Noam 
Chomsky, twelve British Labor MPs, Giuseppe 
Boffa, Paolo Spriano, Giuliano Procacci, Manolis 
Glezos, Michael Raptis, Lady Amalia Fleming, 
Simone de Beauvoir, Louis Althusser, Ernst 
Mandel and Dr. Gunther Anders.
The appeal follows a request from Yuri Larin, 
son of Bukharin, received by the Foundation and 
addressed to Enrico Berlinguer, leader of the 
Italian Communist Party. The letter o f Yuri Larin 
appears below.
The Italian Communist Party responded on 
June 16 through a long article in l’Unita by Paolo 
Spriano and later that month in an even more 
detailed article by Giuliano Procacci in 
Rinascita. The latter article, translated by Dave 
Davies, is reprinted here. Procacci, Professor of 
History at the University of Florence, has recently 
visited Australia at the invitation of the Frederick 
May Foundation to participate in the first 
Australian Conference on “ Italian Culture and 
Italy Today” . During his stay he spoke to meetings 
in Sydney and Melbourne sponsored by 
Australian Left R eview .
These are by no means the first appeals on 
behalf of Bukharin. As his son records, he and his 
mother have been making appeals since 1961, the 
year of the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union. Four old Bolsheviks also made 
an appeal at that time. They included a former 
secretary of Lenin and of the Comintern, E. 
Stasova. According to Larin, as late as June 1977, 
an official of the CPSU Central Committee 
informed him that the verdicts against Bukharin 
had not been set aside.
Why rake up old sores?
This year, A LR  has recorded several important 
anniversaries, mostly of a decade ago. We wrote of 
the Tet offensive in Viet Nam, the “ May Days” in 
Paris, the birth and defeat of the “ Prague Spring” .
It is not that anniversaries, as such, are 
important, but if the events have historic 
significance it can be valuable to recall things 
which influence present practice. This year marks 
the ninetieth anniversary of Bukharin’s birth and 
the fortieth anniversary of his execution.
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Bukharin joined the Bolshevik Party when he 
was eighteen. He was elected to its Central 
Committee in 1917 and remained a leader 
throughout the next twenty years. During much of 
this time (Dec. 1917 until 1929) he was editor of 
Pravda. From 1926 to 1929 he was at the head of 
the Communist International. The communists of 
the ’20s and ’30s knew him as both a theorist and 
an organiser. Later, he became, with others, a 
“non-person” , yet in Lenin’s testament he was 
called “ the favorite son of the party” .
As late as 1936, he had been sent abroad to 
negotiate the purchase of the archives of the 
German Social Democratic Party. These were at 
risk following Hitler’s rise to power and contained 
many writings of Marx.
He was arrested early in 1937. Together with 
Rykov and nineteen others he was indicted in 
February 1938. The trial of the “ Rights and 
Trotskyites” opened on March 2. Present in the 
court were large numbers of Soviet citizens and 
many foreign observers. The defendants were 
charged with entering into relations with foreign 
states to gain arms, engaging in espionage, 
wrecking the economy and participating in 
terrorist acts. Bukharin was specifically accused 
of the murder of Gorki. It was also said that he 
conspired to murder Lenin. The trial lasted eleven 
days. One defendant was sentenced to 25 years in 
prison, two were sentenced to a 15-year term, 
eighteen were sentenced to death. They were shot 
on March 15.
No communist party challenged the verdict at 
the time. Each communist party was then a 
section of the Communist International which, not 
surprisingly, fully supported the result. It was not 
only communists, however, who accepted the guilt 
of the accused.
After 1956 the situation changed. Not only had 
Khrushchev confirmed the massive illegalities of 
the Stalin period, but a range of rehabilitations 
began. At least seven of the defendants in the 
Bukharin trial were rehabilitated.
To say that some had not been guilty is to cast 
strong doubts that any were guilty, since the 
“plot” involved all twenty-one. Moreover, in 1962 a 
member of the Central Committee of the CPSU 
told a Conference of Soviet Historians 
unequivocally that Bukharin was no terrorist or 
spy. Further, the trial record itself shows that 
Bukharin made few admissions. The only 
evidence against him is the confessions of others, 
some at least of whom are now admitted to have 
been pressured into making false admissions.
Bukharin did say that he was “ guilty'’ in a 
moral-political sense, and it is widely believed that
this admission was designed to save the lives of his 
wife and son. His last message, learnt by heart by 
his wife in the prison, confirms that he regarded 
his life as devoted to socialism and that “ Pravda 
prints the filthiest lie, that I, Nikolai Bukharin, 
have wishes to destroy the triumphs of October, to 
restore capitalism” .
Many students of communism and many 
communist parties have considered the Stalin 
period and, in the words of l ’Unita “ have defined 
aberrant judicial enquiries, trials, condemnations 
and repressions for what they truly were” . 
Consideration of the period ended within the 
Soviet Union after 1964, but others, not least the 
Italian Communist Party, have tried to evaluate 
all of Bukharin’s work.
So long as the mistakes and deformations of the 
period are not fully faced it is difficult to conceive a 
flowering of democracy in the Soviet Union. Until 
the lessons of the past are recognised, the positive 
achievements of socialism will be heavily 
conditioned. And those who refuse to face their 
past cannot hope to develop a present and future 
practice free from authoritarianism or develop 
their theory free from dogma.
In this sense, Giuliano Procacci correctly titles 
his article “ Reckoning With All Our Past” and 
indicates that it is necessary to re-establish 
historical truth not only for Bukharin but for “all 
those who shared that tragic fate, from Tomsky to 
Trotsky” .
It may be said that some would rather let the 
past sleep, but it will not and cannot. It is nonsense 
that great leaders of the Russian revolution are 
unknown in their own country, that their pictures 
cannot be displayed or their writings read. Could 
one understand the Russian revolution without 
reading Lenin? How then can one understand it, 
and the civil war, without reading Trotsky? And is 
it possible to understand the strengths and 
weaknesses of Soviet policies in industry and 
agriculture without Bukharin?
Moreover, distortions of socialism continue. 
Such distortions are used by the enemies of 
socialism not only to contain the Soviet Union but 
to denigrate socialism, to present socialism as a 
system which restricts rather than enhances 
social rights and, especially, individual liberty. In 
the past, as now, it is not a matter of endorsing all 
the views o f those labelled “ enem ies”  or 
“dissenters” but of creating the conditions where 
views are subject tojjenuine debate and to the test 
ot practice, so that “ incorrect views are aeleated 
by political means, not by administrative acts.
For such reasons it is appropriate to call for the 
reopening of the case of Bukharin and to commend 
the appeal of his son, which concludes with the 
last, moving and challenging, words of his father.
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B u k h a rin  an d  T ro ts k y  sh o w n  as a tw o -h ea d e d  m o n ste r  
labelled  “ T h e R ig h t-T ro tsk y is t M o n s tro s ity ” . T h e hand  
h o ld ing  th e m  b ac k  b ea rs  th e .la b e l “ G e s ta p o ” .
Yuri Larin ’s letter to E nrico Berlinguer:
"Respected Comrade Berlinguer,
I am writing this letter to you on the eve of the 
U)th anniversary o f the tragic death of my father. 
Xikolai Ivanovich Bukharin. At that time I teas 
only two years old and naturally wa^unable to 
remember my father. But my mother, who had 
spent many years in Stalin's prisons and camps, 
miraculously survived and told me the truth about 
my father. Later (I.M. Krzhizhanovsky, oncofV.I. 
Lenin's closest friends, and old Bolsheviks, who 
had lived through the terror and who had known 
Xikolai Ivanovich in one circumstance or another, 
told me about him. In addition I read many 
Bolshevik books twhich arc banned in our country 
even today and have been preserved only by 
chance by certain Old Bolsheviks) including books 
by Xikolai Ivanovich himself and the works of 
foreign researchers. The information which I 
obtained in this way helped me to fully appreciate 
the character and the social and political activity 
of my father I understood the enormity of Stalin's 
crimes, the extent to which he had falsified the 
history o f the Party, the absurdity and stupidity of 
the accusations levelled against my father at the 
Plenum  o f  the C en tra l C om m ittee  o f  
February March 1937 and the trial o f the so-called 
"Right Trotskyist Bloc . However, on the basis of 
these absurd charges /espionage, treason, 
sabotage and murderI. my lather was expelled 
from the Central Committee and from the Party 
and condemned to death.
Beginning in 1961 my mother A.M. Larina and 
then I myself persistently raised ivith the highest 
Party-State organs of the country the question of 
the withdrawal o f the monstrous allegations 
against X.I. Bukharin and his restoration to Party 
membership. This question was also raised with 
the Party leadership by the most senior of the Old 
Bolsheviks led by the former secretary of the 
Central Committee of the Party, E.I). Stasova. 
They died some time ago without receiving an 
answer and it teas only last summer(1977) that we 
at last received some response in the form of a 
telephone call. An official of the Commission o f 
Party Control of the Central Committee of the 
CPSU informed us by telephone that the 
accusations made at the trial of Bukharin had not 
been withdrawn as the process o f examining the 
documents relating to the trial had not been 
completed: the question o f the restoration o f his 
Party membership could not. therefore, yet be 
resolved. This means that 40 years after the 
execution of my father we have received an 
answer, which, in effect, confirms the monstrous 
charges o f Stalin. My approach to the Courts (the 
Supreme Court of the USSR) has been fruitless: the 
simple truth is they don't answer me.
In a country where the greater part o f the 
population has been brought up on the 
mendacious "Short Course" there are many who 
still consider my father as a traitor and a hireling- 
of-Hitler although in reality the truth is that he 
was an outstanding fighter against fascism and in 
his last years he devoted all his energies to the 
exposure of fascism and to warnings against the 
growing fascist threat.
Leaving home for the last time for the Plenum of 
February March 1937 (from which he never 
returnedI my father said to my mother “don’t 
become embittered: there are sad errors in history.
I want my son to grow up as a bolshevik”. He 
looked on the events which had occurred as tragic 
but transient: he believed in the ultimate victory of 
the forces o f socialism.
I am not a member o f the Party but for my father 
the word "Bolshevik" undoubtedly means a 
fighter for social justice. And we are unable to 
obtain such justice in our country for a man whom 
Lenin before his death called "the favourite of the 
whole Party". For my mother, who lived through 
the horrors of Stalin's camps, who knew many of 
Lenin's comrades-in-arms, representatives o f the 
old Bolshevik Party — people about idiom she 
preserves in her memory the happiest recollections 
and of whom she always speaks with tenderness 
and love — life in such a situation is becoming 
more and more intolerable. It is inconceivable that 
people who still carry on their shoulders the 
burden of Stalin's crimes and have not cast it into 
the dustbin o f history can fight for high ideals.
I am approaching you. Comrade Berlinguer, not 
only because you are the leader of the largest 
communist party o f western Europe and have
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thrown off this burden hut also because N.I. 
Bukharin was a Communist-Internationalist, an 
active member o f the International Workers’ 
Movement. He was known to Communists of 
many countries: they always recalled him with 
warmth. Some of them are still living and working 
in the ranks of the Italian Communist Party. I 
particularly have in mind Comrade Umberto 
Terracini.
I am approaching you to ask you to participate 
in the campaign for the rehabilitation of my 
father, in whatever form seems to you to be most 
appropriate.
Not long before his death Nikolai Ivanovich 
wrote a letter “to the future generation o f leaders of 
the Party’ ’ in which he appealed to them “ to 
unravel the monstrous tangle o f crimes’ ’. My 
mother learnt the text of this letter by heart in the 
dark days and after her rehabilitation she passed 
it on to the Central Committee o f the Party. This 
letter ended with the words:
“Know Comrades that on the banner which you 
will carry in your victorious march towards 
communism there is a drop of my blod. "
Yours sincerely,
Yu. Larin (Bukharin) 12.3.78. 
B ukharin ’ s last testament:
I am leaving life. I am lowering my head not 
before the proletarian axe, which must be 
merciless but also virginal. I feel my helplessness 
before a hellish machine, which, probably by the 
use of medieval methods, has acquired gigantic 
power, fabricates organised slander, acts boldly 
and confidently.
Dzerzhinski is gone; the remarkable traditions 
of the Chekha have gradually faded into the past, 
when the revolutionary idea guided all its actions, 
justified cruelty to enemies, guarded the state 
against any kind o f counter-revolution. That is 
how the Chekha earned special confidence, special 
respect, authority and esteem. At present, most of 
the so-called organs o f the NKVD are a degenerate 
organisation o f bureaucrats, without ideas, rotten, 
well-paid, who use the Chekha ’s bygone authority 
to cater to Stalin’s morbid suspiciousness (Ifear to 
say more) in a scramble for rank and fame, 
concocting their slimy cases, not realising that 
they are at the same time destroying themselves — 
history does not put up with witnesses o f foul 
deeds.
Any member of the Central Committee, any 
mem ber of the Party can be rubbed out, turned into 
a traitor, terrorist, diversionist, spy, by these 
“wonder-working organs”. If Stalin should ever 
get any doubts about himself, confirmation would 
instantly follow.
Storm clouds have risen over the Party. My one 
head, guilty o f nothing, will drag down thousands
of guiltless heads. For an organisation must be 
created, a Bukharinite organisation, which is in 
reality not only non-existent now. the seventh year 
that I have had not a shadow of disagreement with 
the Party, but was also non-existent then, in the 
years o f the right opposition. About the secret 
organisations of Riutin and Uglanov, I knew 
nothing. I expounded my views, together with 
Rykov and Tomskii, openly.
I have been in the Party since I was eighteen, 
and the purpose o f my life has always been to fight 
for the interests o f the working class, for the 
victory of socialism. These days the paper with the 
sacred name Pravda prints the filthiest lie. that I. 
Nikolai Bukharin, have wished to destroy the 
triumphs of October, to restore capitalism. That is 
unexampled insolence, that is a lie that could be 
equalled in insolence, in irresponsibility to the 
people, only by such a lie as this: it has been 
discovered that Nikolai Romanov devoted his 
whole life to the struggle against capitalism and 
monarchy, to the struggle for the achievement o f a 
proletarian revolution. If, more than once. I was 
mistaken about the methods o f building socialism, 
let posterity judge me no more harshly than 
Vladimir Illich did. We were moving towards a 
single goal for the first time, on a still unblazed 
trail. Other times, other customs. Pravda carried 
a discussion page, everyone argued, searched for 
ways and n\eans, quarrelled and made up and 
moved on together.
I appeal to you, a future generation of Party 
leaders, whose historical mission will include the 
obligation to take apart the monstrous cloud of 
crimes that is growing ever hungrier in these 
frightful times, taking fire like a flame and 
suffocating the Party.
I appeal to all Party members'. I am confident 
that sooner or later the filter of history will 
inevitably sweep the filth from my head. I was 
never a traitor; without hesitation I would have 
given my life for Lenin's, I loved Kirov, started 
nothing against Stalin. I ask a new young and 
honest generation of Party leaders to read my 
letter at a Party Plenum, to exonerate me, and to 
reinstate me in the Party.
Know, comrades, that on that banner, which you 
will be carrying in the victorious march to 
communism there is a drop of my blood.”
N. Bukharin.
Settling Accounts with the Past
by Giuliano Procacci
The appeal which Yuri Larin, son of 
Nikolai Bukharin, has launched for the 
rehabilitation o f his father has evoked a wide 
response in Italy. The press has featured the 
fact that communist scholars and militants,
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including the writer, have signed it and 
expressed their support.
The request addressed to the Soviet 
government calls for a review o f the 
iniquitous sentence o f death on one o f the 
most eminent and prestigious people in the 
leading group o f Bolsheviks and the removal 
o f the infamies and calumnous accusations 
which have weighed upon his memory for so 
many years. It is an act o f justice which 
imposes itself and calls out for action.
I would like, however, to emphasise that 
the communist scholars certainly have not 
waited for this opportunity to dissociate 
themselves from the aberrant judgements of 
the Short Course o f  1938 [i.e., The History o f  
the CPSU(B) — trans.l and to approach the 
person of Bukharin in the spirit o f historical 
objectivity. Paolo Spriano in his article in 
I’Unita has already recalled the contribution 
o f scholars like Ernesto Ragionieri, Giuseppe 
Boffa and others to the study o f the thought 
and political action o f Bukharin in the 
framework o f an analysis o f the general 
phenomenon o f Stalinism. For my part, I can 
recall that 15 years ago Editori Riuniti fa 
publishing house — trans.l published a 
collection o f texts on the debate around the 
problems of permanent revolution and of 
socialism in one country in the years 
1924—1926. As well as texts o f Trotsky, 
Zinoviev and Stalin, a piece by Bukharin 
was also reproduced. Recently (the same 
Editori R iuniti published  an Ita lian  
translation o f a work by Moshe Lewin in 
which he devotes great attention to the 
person o f Bukharin and emphasises the 
topicality of his thought. I should like also to 
recall that we are indebted to Alberto Ponsi, a 
young communist scholar, for an accurate 
analysis o f the role played by Bukharin in 
the preparatory stages o f  the 1936 
Constitution.
This interest in the person o f Bukharin is 
easily understood. Am ong the Bolshevik 
leaders who stood at the head o f the Soviet 
state after the death o f Lenin, Bukharin was 
probably the most gifted in capacity and 
richness of political elaboration, as Lenin 
himself recognised in his testament.
The name o f Bukharin is usually closely 
associated with the battle he conducted in 
the years 1928—29 against the options taken 
by Stalin in agrarian and economic policy 
which led to forced collectivisation in the
following years. Certainly, this battle was 
the central and most important episode in 
Bukharin’s political career, but it would be 
an error not to set it in a wider framework. 
The political development o f Bukharin goes 
back m uch further, u n fo ld in g  in an 
extrem ely com plex and con trad ictory  
manner.
Naturally it is impossible here to trace 
even a profile in summary, and I will limit 
myself to drawing the attention o f the reader 
to several more important and less known 
points.
To Bukharin is attributed the first 
form ulation  o f  the process o f  w orld 
revolution as a conquest o f the “ city” by the 
countryside, o f tbe metropolis by the 
colonies, a formula which, as is known, was 
taken up again in China in the years o f the 
“ cultural revolution” . This latter expression 
also recurs in the writings o f Bukharin, and 
one o f his best-known works is devoted to it.
In my judgement, the major contribution 
o f Bukharin in the period preceding the 
polemics on collectivisation consists in 
having been the first, along with Palmiro 
Togliatti, to advance the watchword o f the 
“ defence o f peace”  and to foreshadow the 
hypothesis that war could be avoided as a 
general strategy o f foreign policy o f the 
Soviet U nion and the in tern ation al 
communist movement. As is known, this 
w atchw ord and th is prospect w hich  
Bukharin and Togliatti advanced as early as 
1928 were then taken up again by Dimitrov 
at the VII Congress o f the International in
1935 and with greatforceby the XX Congress 
o f the CPSU in 1956. It is very probable that 
the taking o f this position is not unconnected 
with the removal o f Bukharin from the 
presidency o f the Communist International 
immediately after the VI Congress.
One can also advance the hypothesis that 
Bukharin was in a certain sense one o f those 
who anticipated the turning point (with the 
VII Congress) in Soviet and Communist 
International diplomacy after Hitler came to 
power. Whatever else is certain, it is sure that 
once this change was made Bukharin was 
one o f its most decisive and intelligent 
supporters. If one takes into consideration all 
his political activity from January 1933 
when he returned to be a front-rank political 
figure as editor o f Izvestia , it becomes 
evident that Bukharin was one o f the Soviet
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leaders with a clear perception of the danger 
o f nazism and fascism and the necessity to 
combat and isolate them. In Bukharin’s 
activities as a publicist, the insistence on the 
necessity o f a political and ideological 
struggle against fascism constitutes without 
doubt one o f the dominant and frequently 
recurring themes. To this vision and 
conception o f international problems is 
welded firmly his conception o f the internal 
problems o f  the Soviet Union. He was fully 
conscious o f the dangers which menaced his 
country, and he used the formula o f capitalist 
encirclement then current. He believed, 
however, that as well as providing for 
military security the Soviet Union had to 
p re p a re  i t s e l f  for e v e n tu a lit ie s  by 
consolidating its internal cohesion, and that 
to this end it was necessary to relieve the very 
serious socia l and p o litica l ten sion s 
provoked by the traumatic experiences o f 
collectivisation and the first five-year plan. 
The road pointed out by Bukharin to realise 
this objective was that of the strengthening 
o f socialist democracy. In this light, we must 
see his final battle to introduce into the 1936 
Constitution elements which would assure a 
major articulation of democracy in the Soviet 
system. It was a battle conducted with 
liberality and ingenuity. It was, however, a 
battle lost. The Stalin Constitution which 
was finally approved did not take up the 
proposals o f Bukharin, and the Plenum of 
February 1937, was one of the most dismal 
pages in the whole o f Soviet history, 
bordering on a coup d ’etat. It put an end not 
only to the career o f  Bukharin but also to the 
hopes o f renewal and democratisation which 
seemed to make progress between the XVII 
Congress o f the CPSU and the assassination 
o f Kirov. After the Plenum o f February 1937 
came the purges and the trials which cut 
down the whole leading group o f the 
Bolshevik party.
The trag ic  fate o f  B ukharin, w hile 
involving particularly touching human 
aspects, did not differ from that o f many 
other Bolshevik leaders who shared or 
o p p o s e d  h is  p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t i o n s ,  
oppositionists o f right or left, o f  Tomsky and 
o f T rotsky . T od a y ’s dem and for the 
rehabilitation o f Bukharin is also a demand 
for justice for all those who shared his tragic 
fate, and for a process to re-establish 
historical truth. It seems to me that this must 
be said not only for obvious reasons o f equity 
and justice, but also to dispel in anticipation
the doubt that behind the request for 
Bukharin’s rehabilitation there are strictly 
incidental reasons.
There exists in fact a tendency, o f which 
the book by Moshe Lewin is probably the 
most genuine evidence, to emphasise the 
topicality o f the political thought of 
Bukharin and to see in him the forerunner 
and inspirer o f the reforming tendencies 
which are present today in Soviet society and 
which found expression in the discussions on 
economic reform in 1965. Personally, I must 
say that this type o f approach to history and 
the Soviet reality seems to me more firmly 
based and therefore more convincing than 
that, for example, which is expressed in 
workerist or Trotskyist tomes, such as in the 
works o f Charles Bettelheim, to quote the 
best known example. In any case I believe 
that this kind o f  approach can evoke 
reservations and criticisms as in fact has 
happened in Italy. It is a matter o f complex 
questions which we have long sought to 
discuss and on which the debate certainly 
cannot be considered closed. However, I 
repeat, this is not the point which is now in 
question. The appeal o f Yuri Larin offers to 
us rather the opportunity to re-affirm a 
princip le w hich  is general and not 
incidenta l; that the h istory  o f  the 
com m unist, Soviet and international 
movement is a great and tragic history; that 
to it belongs in full the right o f all those who, 
like Bukharin, have fought in its ranks and 
have paid with their lives for the courage of 
their ideals. The re-estab lishm ent o f 
historical truth is not only an obligatory act 
towards these comrades who have fallen and 
been slandered, but also a necessity of our 
movement.
I am in fact con v in ced  that from 
knowledge o f our past, o f all our past, with its 
successes, its achievements, its errors, its 
crimes and its tragedies, our maturity and 
our socia list con scien ce  will emerge 
reinforced.
— translated by I).I).
Who Was Bukharin
Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin was 29 when 
the Russian revolution broke out in 1917, and 
already a well-known leader o f the Bolshevik 
party. His politica l developm ent had
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tra v e rs e d  the p ath  o f  m a n y  o th er  
r e v o lu t io n a r y  le a d e rs : th e  s tu d e n t 
movement, 1905, prison, exile. Abroad he 
had engaged in intense publicist activity, 
above all in theory, making an important 
contribution  to the developm ent o f  
“ Bolshevism” as a distinct kind o f European 
Marxism. Among his party comrades he was 
one who principally concerned him self with 
contemporary economic and sociological 
thought: his book World Economics and 
Im perialism  an ticipated  som e o f  the 
subsequent theses o f Lenin on imperialism. 
Returning to Russia in May 1917 he played a 
prominent part in orienting the party 
towards Lenin’s positions. He became a 
member o f the central committee and took 
part in the insurrection in Moscow where he 
became the most popular leader.
On the morrow of October he led, in 
polemics with Lenin, the opposition to the 
signing o f the treaty o f Brest-Litovsk. During 
the Civil War he was the editor o f Pravda, the 
official organ o f the party, and distinguished 
him self above all for his publicist activities 
and anti-vulgarisation. In The Econom y o f  
the Transition Period (1920) he justified the 
methods o f “ war com munism” and in 
Historical Materialism  (1921) he earned the 
reputation o f the official theoretician of 
bolshevism.
With the ending of “ war com munism” and 
the launching o f NEP (1921) there began for 
Bukharin a phase o f profound re-thinking 
which brought him in a short time to 
becoming one o f the most passionate 
supporters o f the New Economic Policy.
His role in Soviet history was one o f the 
first rank after the death o f Lenin (1924), 
when a struggle for power commenced 
within the leading Bolshevik group, and 
when there was a deepening o f differences on 
the mode o f development o f the revolution 
and the industrialisation o f the country. In 
those years, Bukharin  e laborated , in 
polemics with the exponents o f the “ left” 
(Trotsky, Preobrazhensky and subsequently 
Kamenev and Zinoviev), a gradualist 
conception o f the construction o f socialism 
based on the NEP model and on the rejection 
o f any coercive policy towards the peasants 
(the “ dictatorship o f industry” ). Rejecting 
the thesis of the prolongation o f the class 
struggle into the phase following the taking 
o f power, he defended a “ pluralist”  concept of 
the transition society. It was he who
elaborated theoretically the Stalin formula 
o f “ socialism in one country” .
After defeating the left opposition, from 
1925 to 1928 it was Bukharin together with 
Stalin who established the main lines o f 
Soviet policy: in those .years, official 
Bolshevism was “ Bukharinist” . From 1926 
he was also at the head o f the Comintern 
where he exercised a wide international 
in fluence, en ergetica lly  d raw in g the 
attention o f the communist movement to the 
revolutionary resurgence o f the colonial 
world.
His name, however, is linked above all 
with the dramatic struggle in opposition to 
the methods o f Stalinism. When, during the 
crisis o f NEP, the idea was advanced o f a 
five-year plan, Bukharin (in a hard battle 
which involved the whole party) defended, 
against the forced collectivisation o f the 
countryside, the perspective o f a plan which 
would respect fundamental economic laws 
and the free self-determination o f the 
peasants. The struggle between Stalinists 
and Bukharinists involved the whole world 
communist movement: the theses o f the VI 
Congress o f the Comintern on “ social 
fascism ” were the result o f the victory o f the 
former over the latter.
After 1929, the year o f the defeat o f 
Bukharin and the beginning of the first five- 
year plan, the power o f Stalin was not 
challenged again. Beginning with 1933 and 
ending in 1936, following terrible difficulties 
o f the first attempts at planning, there was 
formed in the USSR an underground 
opposition to the methods o f Stalin which 
took up many o f the concepts o f the 
Bukharinist “ right” . At the XVII Congress 
o f the party (1934) there was a significant 
affirmation o f the moderate wing which 
brought about a new balan ce , a lbeit 
temporary, in the party. Bukharin spoke at 
the Congress, and was again reinstated into 
several positions of prestige. The turning 
point of the VII Congress o f the Comintern 
(1935) was also a result o f this new balance 
within the leading group o f Bolsheviks.
In 1936, Stalin unleashed mass terror 
against the party and instigated the Moscow 
trials against the old opposition leaders. In 
1938, Bukharin was arrested and tried for 
improbably accusations, condemned to 
death and shot.
Trans, by D.D.
The Unions:
What of the Future?
Gerry Phelan
It is com monly asserted especially in times 
o f economic crisis, that unions are too 
powerful. It is the kind o f statement which, 
on the face o f it, is not discriminating, but 
when you get down to it, is directed at those 
u n io n s  or th o se  s e c t io n s  o f  u n io n  
membership which are actually doing 
something. So it is not all unions that are too 
powerful — only the active ones.
On further examination it usually becomes 
clear that the union is acting to protect or 
improve the wages or working conditions o f 
its membership which is precisely the reason 
why it was formed. In pursuit o f those aims it 
attempts to marshall all the power it needs in 
order to be successful. It will use industrial, 
economic, political, or legal power or public 
opinion. It will use film, song, and dance. In 
short the union will attempt to use all the 
instruments typically used by any group 
pursuing sectional interests.
The unions are a product o f capitalism. 
They arose as a reaction on the part o f 
working people to the power o f capital and to 
the many ways in which that power was 
expressed. They continue to operate in a 
capitalist economic and social svstem in
* Gerry Phelan is a lecturer in Sociology at 
Macquarie University, NSW. This article is a 
paper he presented t<1 the Conference o f Labour 
Economists held in Brisbane at the end o f June 
last.
which capital is increasingly centralised, 
increasingly concentrated and ever so much 
more powerful than it was when the unions 
were born.
Capitalism is a system in which the 
powerful thrive. The weak go to the wall. To 
survive in the system , econ om ica lly , 
industrially, politically or in almost any 
context, power is essential. Reason and 
perhaps moral right could be helpful but are 
not as important as power, and there is no 
such thing as too much power! Those are the 
rules. Trade unionists, like everybody else 
who lives in the society, have learnt those 
rules, often through bitter experience. It’s not 
nice. It’s not fair. But that’s capitalism.
Power is far from equitably distributed 
throughout the society; it is more easily and 
quickly brought into operation by some 
groups and individuals than by others and 
there are differences in the extent to which it 
can be sustained. Trade union power is more 
apparent than real, more ephemeral than 
sustained, and more reactive than initiating. 
For these reasons it is hardly to be compared 
with the major power agencies in the 
community if we are looking at the dominant 
agents o f social change or powerful barriers 
to social change. The employment question 
brings this point into focus. The unions are 
no more responsible for Australia’s current 
h igh  unem ploym ent than  they were 
responsible ten years ago for the reverse. If
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the employee, via the machine, to the 
employer, limits job content (and, ultimately, 
tra d e  t r a in in g  p ro g r a m s )  and  jo b  
availability which are issues o f particular 
concern to school leavers. Large numbers o f 
unemployed young people throw additional 
pressures onto the fam ily as a support 
system and build up pressure for an increase 
in real wages for those parents who are 
employed.
Thus, the power of the corporation as it is 
exercised in pursuit o f corporate interest 
reaches out into much wider areas o f social 
life.
It is especially important to develop an 
understanding that these consequences o f 
the use of corporate power are not such as can 
be overcome by improvements in wages or 
working conditions. Such improvements, 
though welcome, do nothing to challenge the 
p o w e r  o f  th o s e  w h o , b y  d e s ig n  or 
inadvertently, produce these situations and 
hence do nothing to ensure they will not be 
repeated. W hile w ages increase, the 
problems get worse. This is not an argument 
that wage and salary earners, through their 
un ions or otherw ise, should  abandon  
attempts to maintain or improve their 
standard o f living. The reduction in real 
wages over the period that wage indexation 
has been operating in Australia shows that 
this must be a continuing concern. But for 
present purposes the more important point is 
that, despite the best efforts o f the unions in 
maintaining the purchasing power o f those 
o f their members who do have jobs, they are 
unable to do even that effectively.
If real wages are to be maintained which 
means, at the very least, maintaining 
security o f employment, wage and salary 
earners need greater power over a much 
broader range o f issues. For this to occur it 
will be necessary to develop a much greater 
understanding o f the need for it within the 
union movement. Such an understanding 
will be more easily developed if it begins 
fronij and grows out of, the situation faced by 
people in everyday life.
In the fa c e  o f  h ig h  and  r is in g  
unemployment and the need to resist it, wage 
and salary earners might now be willing to 
grapple with the issues and to try, 
themselves, to develop some approaches 
different from those they traditionally use. 
As well as pressing the employer for
redundancy schemes and severance pay they 
might be willing to think about alternative 
product strategies, about how the plant 
might be used to produce different goods 
which might not be as profitable but which 
might satisfy some social need. The example 
o f the Lucas Aerospace workers in Britain 
producing kidney machines is a case in 
point.
O f course, not all plants will easily lend 
themselves to alternative production and so 
the Lucas example might not be as readily 
transferable as it might at first appear. In 
any case, rather than imposing solutions 
from outside, it would be important to go to 
the wage and salary earners at the shop or 
office floor and encourage them to unleash 
their creative energy on an activity that, 
after all, would be directly in their interests. 
It will be easier for the unions to begin this 
processif they have previously developed at 
the work place, some competent shop-floor 
organisation such as a shop committee or a 
com bined  un ions com m ittee. Such a 
development would also imply, among other 
things, that they had previously undertaken 
the often bitter struggle to win from the 
e m p lo y e r  th e  r ig h t  to h a v e  u n io n  
organisation on the job, and it would also 
imply that the unions had overcome any 
barriers that might have prevented them 
from working together at the job level. The 
development of shop-floor organisation 
would also be assisted if at least some o f 
those involved had participated in some form 
o f union education program.
Even if these preparatory steps have not 
been taken, it might well be, as mentioned 
above, that in the face o f high and rising 
unemployment and the need to resist it, wage 
and salary earners might now be willing to 
develop some new approaches. It may be that 
the ideas they come up with will be rejected 
by the controllers of the corporation becaue 
the rate o f return might not be high enough, 
in which case it would be necessary to resort 
to industrial and political action in order to 
keep the plant open. Although this action 
would be concerned principally with job 
security and wages and to that extent might 
be interpreted as a narrow  section al 
approach it would also inextricably link 
those issues to a challenge to the employers’ 
power to keep the plant closed when people 
want to work. And that is a significantly 
different thing.
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the unions had the power often claimed of 
them, they would not have tolerated the high 
numbers o f their members out o f work. If 
overseas forecasts are any guide, it will get 
worse. Clive Jenkins, the General Secretary 
of the Association of Scientific, Technical 
and Managerial Staffs in Britain, estimates 
that unem ploym ent in the European 
Economic Community will increase from the 
present six million to 18 million by 1990. (1)
The unions just do not have the power to 
make or not to make the investment decision, 
the very decision which increases job 
opportunities or alternatively substitutes 
capital for labor and reduces the number o f 
jobs available. The situation at the Chrysler 
plants in South Australia provides an 
example. Early in May 1978, the company 
announced plans to sack 1100 employees; 
altogether the workforce will be reduced from
7,000 a little over a year ago to 4,000 in 1979. 
The decision to install the existing plant or 
hire the recent workforce or produce the 
current models were made entirely by the 
company. The unions had no part in them. 
The success or otherwise the company has in 
bringing those and other factors together, as 
expressed in Chrysler’s share o f vehicle 
sales, is again something over which the 
union has little power. It is only at the point 
where the com pan y begins sack in g  
employees that the union, especially the 
people at the shop floor, can act. And at that 
point what action is open to them? At the 
very least they must have a meeting to 
discuss the situation. On the day they plan to 
do this the com pany closes the plant early, (2) 
issues d ism issal notices and thereby 
frustrates any possibility of the bringing into 
effect o f the unions’ reactive power.
When compared with the giants in the 
vehicle industry, the unions are small fry. 
But on the other hand, if unionists attempt to 
protect or advance their interests, say, in the 
metal industry by means o f a general nation­
wide wage claim, it is more than likely that 
many small employers would be placed in 
serious difficulty. To these, the unions, in 
their turn, could appear too strong. But then 
small businesses are particularly vulnerable 
to changes in their environment — financial, 
industrial or marketing. They, too, like wage 
and salary earners, are early victims o f 
greater power exerted elsewhere within the 
capitalist system. As capital is further 
centralised and concentrated there is less
scope for small business; it can expand only 
in the narrowing economic interstices. 
T y p ica lly  sm all business  people are 
encouraged to see their situation as caused 
solely by the immediate demands o f trade 
unions and to utterly ignore the lessons of 
their own collective experience, namely, that 
even if they accommodate those demands 
they face, jointly with wage and salary 
earners, the greater power o f capital.
What is being suggested then, is that it is 
capital, principally in the form o f the large 
national and multinational corporations, 
which has too much power and jt is time it 
was brought under popular control. Rather 
than the trade unions in Australia killing 
socialism, as has sometimes been suggested, 
the power o f capital has meant that 
socialism has not yet been born.
As this power is exercised, as for example it 
is with respect to manufacturing industry in 
Australia, it becomes increasingly important 
to develop an understanding among wage 
and salary earners within the industry of the 
way the power is exercised and the effects it 
produces. The closing o f plants within 
Australia and their reopening in South East 
Asia heralds a profound reshaping o f the 
industry and a decline in its importance as a 
source of wealth and employment. For those 
sections o f the industry which remain in 
Australia the application o f new technology 
produces changes in the labor process which 
disrupt the traditional trades and other job 
c la ss ifica tion s . The a lm ost-com pleted  
retooling program of the British-owned 
h eavy engineering com pa n y , V ickers 
Australia Ltd., (3) illustrates the point. Part 
of the $5,250,000 spent on imported machine 
tools was used to acquire computerised 
numerical control equipment which, when 
linked to vertical borers, is operated from a 
visual display unit and replaces up to three 
machines conventionally operated. But 
w hereas we have com e to expect o f 
technological innovation that it replaces 
labor at the point of production, the 
greater significance o f this particular 
equipment is that, in the event o f equipment 
breakdown, the fault diagnosis normally 
carried out by maintenance staff at Vickers’ 
Melbourne factory will now be carried out in 
the factory o f the manufacturers in the USA 
to which the equipment is connected by 
direct line. The deskilling o f the workforce, as 
control over the labor process passes from
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Such an approach opens the way to further 
ch a llen ges, on b eh a lf o f  the union 
membership, on where additional capital 
should be installed so as to provide work for 
unemployed members thus bringing into 
consideration questions such as urban 
stagnation, regional development and public 
transport facilities.
As the unions embrace these issues in their 
efforts to look after their members they will 
begin to reach out to those increasingly 
numerous groups in society generally, e.g. 
small business people, small farmers, 
environmentalists, who are also affected by 
the power o f capital but who, hitherto, have 
been relatively isolated and kept that way, in 
part, by the power o f the opinion-makers in 
the media.
The greater mutual understanding which 
would develop would not only ally wider 
sections of the population to what had, until 
then, been the concerns o f special interest 
groups, but would thereby broaden the 
opinion-base on which all groups construct 
their policies.
The greater mutual understanding would 
begin to produce, for each group, sound 
knowledge, based on personal experience o f 
other groups, individuals' and issues. Trade 
unionists’ views, for example, o f the women’s 
movement would then be based on direct 
contact and discussion rather ^han or 
mediation or distortion, by the press, radio 
and television. To the extent that thatoccurs 
it would challenge the power o f the media to 
divide and isolate all those various groups 
who are wanting change but have not, as yet, 
found a basis for m utual support or 
compatible programs.
This is hardly a formula for instant 
revolution, but does indicate a way that 
union activity might be expanded in the light 
o f current difficulties. The ideas are not new. 
For example, the Metal Trades Federation o f 
Unions, in the very successful series o f 
seminars held last year on the crisis in 
manufacturing industry, brought together a 
wide range of different groups which had 
hitherto been unconnected. In the public 
sector the form and content o f the process 
m ight be different. For exam ple, the 
Australian Telecommunications Employees’ 
Association (ATEA) has recently launched a 
public campaign which calls into question
the decision o f  the national telephone 
authority, Telecom, to spend $2 biliion on 
computerised exchange equipment known as 
ARE 11. The ATEA has produced a pamphlet 
entitled “ Should you step aside for a 
computer?” and supported it with a paper on 
social and economic issues related to the new 
technology. Care is taken in the pamphlet to 
avoide the charge that the ATEA is simply 
opposing change and it says:
“ We are not suggesting that we abandon 
technology and miss out on the benefits of 
modern science. In the past, technology has 
released large numbers of people from long 
hours, low pay and excessively hard work. 
Technology can also make ordinary men and 
w o m e n  i ts  v i c t i m s  t h r o u g h  ma s s  
unemployment, deskilling o f jobs and 
invasion of privacy.”
Concurrently, the ATEA is calling for 
public evaluation o f Telecom’s plans for 
computerised exchanges. This demand is 
borne out o f  the Association’s practical 
experience, especia lly  T e lecom ’s 1969 
purchase o f the common user data network 
for $20 million. As the Association says:
“ It was plagued by technical difficulties which 
were corrected at the expense of taxpayers- 
customers .... Telecom is looking to dismantle 
the system in all states except Melbourne 
(Victoria).”
Both the manufacturing industry crisis 
and the ARE 11 issue reinforce the view that 
the kinds o f problems facing wage and 
salary earners, whether they be in private 
enterprise or the public service, (1) are not 
such as can be solved by improvements in 
wages and working conditions; (2) impinge 
upon much wider sections o f society, and 
thereby enhance the prospects for mutual 
support referred to above.
The unions’ initiating role in the process is 
crucial. Numerically, they constitute the 
biggest single interest group and speak for a 
population with a heavy dependence on 
week-by-week income and few, if any, 
alternative resources. For such people the 
issues are real and they are important. Given 
that the typical union in Australia is not 
confined to the one employer or industry but 
has members in many industries, the unions 
are far better placed than many individual 
employers to bring together an enormous 
amount of detailed knowledge. O f particular 
importance is the fact that they have well-
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established  structures and processes 
through which this can happen.
In the beginning, o f such a process, the 
unions can expect to come under heavy 
attack from those in the community who say 
that unions should not interfere with 
employers’ prerogatives, that they should 
confine themselves to wages and conditions 
issues. These attacks will have to be dealt 
with when they occur. The entire question of 
employer prerogatives reminds us o f the 
slogan o f the anti-war movement, “ Peace is 
too important to be left to generals” . 
Similarly in a modern, highly industrialised, 
highly integrated, highly interdependent 
economy such as Australia’s, the decisions 
as to what to produce, if and where, how and 
when, are too important to be left to 
employers.
As unions attempt to broaden the base of 
their industrial activity then from less 
conservative quarters the suggestion might 
be made that the problems can be solved at 
the level o f the enterprise by means of 
something that might be called workers’ 
partic ipation . U ndoubtedly there are 
changes which will be necessary to improve 
the situation at that level, but workers 
participating within narrowly-defined limits 
substantially set by the employer at the 
enterprise level is a futile exercise if the 
determining powers are beyond their reach. 
The Chrysler company provides a striking 
exam ple o f  this. A m on g the veh icle  
manufacturers in Australia, it was the first 
to m ake a com m itm ent to w orkers ’ 
participation and the commitment it made 
was substantial. Among many other things, 
it sent a three-person delegation overseas to 
study worker participation schemes in 
several countries. One of the members o f that 
delegation was the president o f the Vehicle 
Builders’ Employees’ Federation (VBU) 
Shop Committee at the com pany’s Tonsley 
Park works in Adelaide. In the light o f the 
com pany’s recent decision to rationalise 
production and sack workers, it is clear that 
any participating the employees might have 
done did nothing at all to increase their 
security o f employment or place any moral 
ob ligation  on the com pan y to find 
alternative employment. In this situation, 
the workers’ participation scheme is simply 
irrelevant.
If the above outline suggests ways in 
which the unions might move in both 
advancing their members’ interests and
challenging the power o f capital, the role of 
the political parties o f the Left, which have 
traditionally influenced the unions, remains 
to be explored. They could do much to 
facilitate the process under discussion.
Capitalism has turned out to be an 
extremely resilient economic and social 
system but the various economic, cultural 
and ideological institutions that underpin it 
are com ing under increasing attack. More 
and more the bases of pwoer are being 
challenged by ordinary people in significant 
ways. Firstly, there is an increasing 
awareness o f the vulnerability o f power 
holders, that the bases on which they rest are 
not as unassailable as has generally been 
assumed. Secondly, ordinary people are 
becoming increasingly conscious o f the 
power they themselves have and how they 
can a ffect outcom es by its use. The 
proliferation, and success of, community 
action groups attest to this.
These developments suggest that the 
h istor ica l tendency tow ards greater 
democracy is beginning to burst through the 
confining cage o f capitalism. They signify 
that the time has come for much greater 
openness in the decision-making process. If 
contending points o f view are not accounted 
for during that process there is now a much 
greater likelihood than previously that 
ordinary people who will be affected by the 
decision, will chain themselves to trees to 
prevent the destruction o f parkland, will lie 
down in front o f bulldozers about to demolish 
their tenanted housing or in other ways will 
apply a veto to decisions made in pursuit o f 
narrow interests.
These developments are not at all partisan; 
they constitute an attack not only on the 
controllers of capital but on all powerholders 
including those in political parties and in 
unions. Not only are they necessary to meet 
current basic problems, but they also lay a 
sound basis on which any future society 
might be constructed.
FOOTNOTES
1. Speech to an international conference on 
Industrial Democracy in Adelaide, South 
Australia, as reported in The Australian 
Financial R eview , May 31, 1978, p. 9.
2. Sydney M orning Herald, May 13, 1978, p. 2.
3. As reported in the Australian Financial 
R eview , June 20, 1978, p. 15.
REVIEWS
Australian Liberalism and National 
Character, by Tim Rowse. Kibble Books, 
1978, pp. 293. $9.50.
Tim Rowse argues that liberalism, in Australia, 
is a many-sided doctrine with a wide influence. He 
attempts to prove that it is an hegemonic ideology, 
and he places liberals in the role of organic 
intellectuals, that is, intellectuals who express the 
interests of Australian industrial capital.
These liberals, the argument continues, have in 
various ways sought to promote a consensus 
within a liberal framework. ‘For the question of 
consensus is inescapable, in one form or another, 
and endemic to intellectual life in a society based 
on the exploitation o f labor and the domination of 
society by the needs o f one class’.(p.S)
Rowse’s method is basically chronological and 
narrative. But before he presents his case studies, 
he offers, in Chapter 1, a definition of liberalism. 
The two important elements in this definition are 
the individual and the community. For there to be 
a viable community, the individual’s values need 
to correspond to some general community outlook. 
Liberalism says that society is an ^nsemble of 
individuals and the state is neutral.
Liberalism places great stress on individual 
freedom, especially the freedom to do business in 
the market place. Most liberals believe in the 
equality o f the individuals who make up the 
ensemble.
It is the author’s purpose to state all this in 
ideological terms, in the sense that he adopts. 
An individual’s ideology expresses a relationship 
with the world, a system of representation of the 
world, and the truth or falsity of the representation 
is not really relevant. The ideology is authentic if it 
is based on a lived relationship. A theoretical 
ideology, in the author’s opinion, is an attempt to 
develop a systematic world-view from this 
relationship. Ideologies, both spontaneous and 
theoretical, make people into subjects — self- 
conscious individuals who act out their ideologies.
Rowse presents four case studies spread over a 
span of fifty years. Case Study 1 deals with 
intellectuals who were active in or associated with 
the Workers’ Educational Association in Sydney 
before and during World War I — people such as 
Francis Anderson, G. V. Portus, R. F. Irvine, 
Meridith Atkinson and C. H. Northcott.
Case Study 2 discusses the prominent historian 
Keith Hancock (author of the seminal book, 
A u stra lia  (and such econom ists as R.C 
Millls, D. B. Copland, Leslie Melville, E. O. G. 
Shann and L. B. Giblin. Case Study 3 examines 
such post-World War II reconstructionists as H. C. 
Coombs, Lloyd Ross and J. G. Crawford, and 
Australian Institute of Political Science figures 
such as W. McMahon Ball and W. G. K. Duncan. 
Case Study 4 looks at so-called new critics such as 
Donald Horne, Craig McGregor, James McAuley, 
Leonie Kramer and Vincent Buckley; and there is 
an afterthought on Ian Turner.
In a short review it is impossible to do justice to 
the detailed discussion that Rowse offers. But the 
reader may incline to the verdict of ‘unproven’. 
Some of the points don’t really fit the thesis all that 
well. At times, the author seems to be forcing 
things a little. Hares are started and not really run 
to ground. And the book doesn't really flow; it is 
more a collection o f loosely linked, fairly disparate 
essays and comments than a carefully 
constructed, comprehensive study.
A major problem is the use of the liberal label 
and the flexibility o f  the author’ s usage. 
Admittedly, Rowse argues that within a general 
liberal discourse there are many views but he 
doesn’t sufficiently develop this point. There are 
‘progressive’ liberals and ‘conservative’ liberals 
such as Peter Coleman, who is now leader of the 
Liberal Party in New South Wales.
There are liberals who are radical and liberals 
may be socialists. The problem is made concrete if 
one considers such people as Donald Home and 
Ian Turner, two who come under consideration in 
Rowse’s book. Horne, who once described himself 
as a radical conservative, could quite properly now 
be described as a not-so-conservative radical. 
Turner has many of the hallmarks of a liberal but 
he is a genuinely libertarian socialist. In fact, 
many socialists are liberals. One important case, 
Brian Fitzpatrick, is hardly mentioned. And the 
omission of John Anderson is very surprising.
There are two other significant points which 
the author overlooks. There is no concerted 
discussion of conservatism as such. Rowse doesn’t 
really argue why liberalism should be ranked 
ahead of conservatism as the ruling class ideology 
o f primary importance. Instead, the wide range of 
liberalism is used to embrace quite diverse 
ideologues, some of whom — McAuley, Kramer
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and Coleman, for example — would be better 
considered within a conservative framework.
A n o t h e r  p o i n t  r e l a t e d  t o  
liberal/radical/socialist interaction concerns the 
roles o f the formed intellectually trained 
ideologues dealt with by Rowse and the largely 
self-taught politically trained ideologues of the 
working class. How far do they interact? How far 
are they opposed or complementary? Or are they 
on quite separate courses?
This is a major issue of ideology in Australia, 
and it is not really unfair to regard this as 
something to which some attention should have 
been given.
Another weakness which impairs the book’s 
force is the shallowness of some of the history. 
Writing of an intellectual group which founded the 
Victorian Labour College, he includes, without 
explanation, the self-taught artisan, W. P. 
Earsman, a founder of the Communist Party, 
among their number. While it is true that trade 
union membership grew in the 1920s, this is no 
indication of intensified class struggle from 1919, 
as appears to be suggested. Using different 
criteria, the opposite would probably be a sounder 
conclusion and the previous decade would be a 
period of sharper class struggle.
Similarly, while the discussion of Lloyd Ross is 
one of the book's virtues, the omission of any real 
attention to the years 1935-40 when Ross was a 
member of the Communist Party, leaves the reader 
wondering.
Finally, the general reader will worry about the
appropriateness of the book’s title. It suggests
much more than the actual subject matter o f the
book. And while there are passages of good
exposition, at times the book’s construction and
prose become an obstacle to a clear understanding
of the author’s meaning. r, „  ____________________________— Roger Coates
Now available....
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C OMME NT  ON B LA C K  A R M A D A  BY 
RUPERT LOCKWOOD .....
by Doug Olive.
Rupert Lockwood’s book Black Arm ada, is a 
significant and excellent work. It deals with the 
contribution made by the left political and trade 
union movements in the struggle o f the 
Indonesian people for national liberation from 
Dutch imperialism.
This struggle and its history has important 
lessons for the left and progressive movements 
today. As one of the most important contributions 
made by the left in our country to international 
solidarity, it deserved a work as well documented 
and presented as Black Arm ada.
The author has researched his material very 
thoroughly. He interviewed dozens of people 
closely associated with the leadership of the 
struggle to boycott Dutch ships and to liberate 
Indonesian patriots from Dutch domination on 
Australian soil. He assembled a wealth o f factual 
information and has put it together in a skilful 
way, making its reading an exciting experience.
One of the outstanding lessons of this struggle 
which comes through clearly in the book is how, in 
the right political conditions, the left-motivated 
sections of the labor movement can inspire the 
forms o f mass action to influence foreign policy 
and the course of history.
The mass of factual information presented by 
the author leaves the reader in no doubt about the 
decisive role played by the Communist Party of 
Australia and the left trade unions, and just as 
clearly exposes the attempt of rightwing leaders of 
the ACTU and the Sydney Labor Council to 
torpedo the struggle.
While I highly commend the book and suggest it 
as a “must” for students o f the history of the 
Australian labor movement and those who like 
historical events presented in a stimulating form, I 
want to correct a few minor inaccuracies.
I also feel that some o f my own personal 
experiences, mainly associated with the struggle
T he B lack  A rm ada, by Rupert Lockwood. 
Australasian Book Society, 1975. 352pp. 
$7.95.
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to close the Dutch horror camp at Casino, may be 
of interest.
As to my role, until now an almost completely 
undercover one: in late 1944, in company with Jack 
Henry, I attended a meeting of the secretariat of 
the Central Committee of the CPA at George St, 
Sydney. The then National President Lance 
Sharkey and Vice-president R. Dixon were the 
secretariat members present. Dixon outlined the 
purpose of the meeting and o f my presence at it.
He pointed out that the inevitable defeat of the 
Japanese in the Pacific and their forced 
evacuation of Indonesian territory would open up 
the way for imperialism, led by the British, to 
attempt to reimpose Dutch colonial domination on 
Indonesia.
The presence of the Dutch administration 
together with leading representatives of the 
Indonesian Communist Party in Australia 
imposed a heavy responsibility on the CPA as the 
main anti-imperialist force in the country.
We accepted the responsibility, he said, as our 
international obligation to assist in every way 
possible the struggle o f the Indonesian 
independence movement.
He, Dixon, had been given the responsibility for 
the development of the struggle nationally, while 
Jack Henry had the responsibility in Queensland. 
He said that because o f the residence in 
Queensland of a large number of Indonesians 
including many of their leaders, the leaders of the 
Queensland State Committee had an extra 
responsibility.
One of the major problems was to' combat the 
narrow ideas of most o f the Indonesian leaders 
who still failed to fully grasp the real nature of the 
struggle and harbored illusions about replacing 
the Dutch with a form of Soviet power. We had 
continually to emphasise that the struggle was an 
anti-colonial one for national liberation. The 
leadership given by the Indonesian party would 
largely determine how successfully the bourgeois 
national liberation movement could finally be 
transformed into a form of people’s power.
One of the real problems was continuity of 
personal day-to-day leadership. Political security 
demanded that this could not be undertaken by a 
member of the secretariat. Jack Henry had 
proposed that, in Queensland, I should be given 
the responsibility of working closely with the 
Indonesian party leadership; the conspiratorial 
character of this work was emphasised.
From then on, until the Indonesians were finally 
sent home, I worked with the Indonesians under 
Henry’s direction.
The language barrier was very real. While some 
of the Indonesians like Sardjono, Slamet and a few 
others had some knowledge of English, the
conveying of ideological, strategic and tactical 
ideas was still very difficult. An attempt was made 
to rectify this by organising, in Queensland, a 
study of the Indonesian (Malay) language under a 
Chinese tutor known as comrade Albert.
Albert was recognised by the Indonesians as a 
leading marxist. He was a member of the resident 
(in Australia) Central Committee o f the 
Indonesian party and attended all leadership 
meetings.
The class was unsuccessful and collapsed after 
only a few weeks. With due respects to Rupert 
Lockwood, who said in Black Armada that Jack 
Henry and Mick Healy both learned Indonesian, 
the fact is that none of us were able to 
communicate even one full sentence in that 
language.
Without Albert acting as interpreter the task of 
conveying our party’s ideas on policy and tactics 
would have been time-consuming and difficult — 
indeed almost impossible.
In April 1945 we received word that the 
Indonesian prisoners at the Casino camp had 
refused the inadequate food served up by the 
Dutch. When this happened the Dutch had 
sounded the alarm and men raced to their tents. 
One Indonesian named Tarzan was shot and 
killed by the Dutch while another named Lenkong 
was wounded.
On September 12 another Indonesian named 
Soendo was killed by a Dutch guard with an 
Austen gun.
About that time we received advice that over 200 
Indonesians had been confined to barracks, living 
in the most terrible conditions. We proposed to the 
Indonesian party leaders that the political 
conditions in Australia were ripe for decisive 
action on this question. Prime Minister Chifley 
was showing signs that he wanted to be shot of the 
Dutch, and action from within the camp 
complemented by increased agitation outside 
could turn the scale, force the closure of the Casino 
camp and free the Indonesians for repatriation to 
their homeland.
It was agreed that I should go to Casino, meet 
with the available Indonesian leaders in the camp 
and put the proposals to them. I was also to 
attempt to get into the camp, posing as a Brisbane 
newspaper reporter.
We met at the home of a railway worker in 
Casino. Although the camp was surrounded by a 
fence, it was not hard for a few inmates to slip out 
at night — except those in the inner compound. 
Nine members o f the Indonesian party were 
present. I explained our views and the forms of 
action we considered appropriate. They greeted 
our proposal with enthusiasm and suggested that 
the best way to initiate the action would be to 
refuse breakfast, which would bring a possibly 
violent reaction from the Dutch.
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Although they had practical experience of the 
violent way in which the Dutch guards were likely 
to react, when it was asked who would be the first 
to refuse the food and initiate the action, every one 
of the nine immediately volunteered. It was 
decided also that the next day should be used to 
discuss the proposed action with all the men in 
the camp and win their support for it.
The next morning I went to the camp by taxi, 
being met at the gate by armed Dutch guards. I 
told them I was a newspaper reporter from 
Brisbane and wished to talk with the camp 
commandant. One of the guards came back and 
beckoned to us to enter. I asked the taxi driver to 
wait for me.
The big boss was not present. His deputy was a 
young, very arrogant product o f Dutch 
colonialism. I told him my paper was very 
concerned about stories circulating in Brisbane 
that the Casino camp was indeed a concentration 
camp that ranked with Belsen and other German 
horror camps. The stories said that Indonesians 
had been shot and that at present over 200 of them 
were in solitary confinement, living in inhuman 
conditions. My paper wished to be able to refute 
these stories, but in order to do so it would be 
necessary for me to examine the camp and the 
conditions of the inmates.
He assured me that the stories were lies. I 
insisted that unless he allowed me to examine 
conditions I would not be able to write a story 
favorable to the Dutch. He then agreed and called 
for a car, saying “ I will take you” . I asked the taxi 
to follow, but the deputy said no, it must wait there.
We drove to the compound (the huts where the 
Indonesians had originally been housed, and 
was now used for “ troublesome” elements) a few 
kilometres away. It covered about two acres of 
ground surrounded by a barbed wire fence 12 to 14 
feet high. Hundreds of Indonesians were inside the 
compound, with armed Dutch guards all around. 
At the four corners machine gun posts were 
mounted, with the guns trained on the inmates. I 
asked were those the guns that had been used to 
shoot the Indonesians. Not at all, he said. We have 
never shot anyone at this camp. They are there for 
the protection of the majority of the Indonesians 
against a criminal and trouble-making element.
The big boss then appeared on the scene. After 
the understrapper told him my story, he said yes, 
they were aware of these lies and were anxious for 
the people to know the truth. I assured him that the 
truth would at last be told.
It was not until I was stepping into my taxi that 
he asked “ What Brisbane paper do you represent?” 
I told the driver to get going and said “ the 
Queensland G uardian” . He exploded.
The story I wrote on that occasion was published 
in the Guardian under the heading “ Casino’s 
Little Belsen” . It was republished later in the local 
Casino newspaper.
Thoughts on “ Com rades Com e R ally”
by Eric Aarons
John Sendy writes well. He captures the flavour 
of time, place and situation. What it was like to be 
young, eager, ready for self-sacrifice for an ideal in 
the ‘forties; the high hopes and spirits of the 
communists in the early postwar period; the “ feel” 
of Tribune selling; of sometimes hostile meetings 
or ones without an audience; the atmosphere of our 
stay in China.
Most of his pen portraits are good, some superb. 
Especially the one o f Ernie Thornton — 
admittedly a person with a character as suited to 
interesting description as his physiognomy was to 
the cartoonist. A few sketches, where one’s 
expectations were high because of the subject’s 
closeness to the author (Alec Robertson for 
instance) are a bit flat by comparison.
John writes with humanity and compassion for 
people, qualities sadly lacking in not a few writers 
these days. He has not set out deliberately to score 
points or ride too hard in the “ get square” stakes, 
though it is clear that he feels deeply a number of 
things and encounters during his life in the party.
He is generous, if not over-generous, in his 
treatment of me personally, and of some others 
with whom his relationships have at times been 
rather stormy.
I don’t know what cuts his publishers made in 
the manuscript, but wonder how, in speaking of 
Eddie Robertson, he doesn’t mention Gloria 
Garton. Gloria is an identity in her own right, but 
the happiness of these two in their all too brief 
association warmed many others as well as 
themselves.
On at least one point o f fact he is wrong. Rather 
surprisingly, because we discussed our childhoods 
a lot while limbering up for our Chinese 
introspections. When Laurie’s and my father Sam 
separated from our mother, Laurie came with him 
to Sydney, while I stayed with mother in 
Melbourne.
My memory of one minor adventure of the 
“innocents abroad” is also different from his — 
though generally I wouldn’t back my powers of 
recollection these days. When Keith McEwan was 
done down in Port Said he had been enticed down 
the gangplank by the seductive cries of the sellers. 
He bad money in his hand which an enterprising
C om rades C om e R ally ! Recollections o f an 
Australian Communist by John Sendy. 
Nelson. $9.95.
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hawker seized, thrusting a large box of “ turkish 
delight” into his victim’s hands. He turned the 
bemused Keith around, pushed him back up the 
gangplank, and scarpered off into the crowd. The 
box, when opened contained a fused, sticky layer 
of revolting jellv. The second layer into w'hich 
Keith dug in forlorn hope was an inch-thick piece 
of wood.
(These dealers were rogues, as they are 
anywhere; but in 1951 they also fused their 
deceptions with the burgeoning nationalism that 
became Nasserism, and carried them out with 
great relish and panache.)
It’s probably being self-indulgent to pursue the 
matter, but stimulated by John’s re-creation of 
atmosphere I have to confess that I was one of the 
un-named two who lusted after Jan and Mimi and 
were so unfeelingly circumvented — doubtless on 
instruction — by the stolid Ching. Take it as 
square-off or envy as you like, but the other one 
(victim of a most untimely fatal heart attack early 
this year, I am sad to say) was the leading light. He 
really had good looks, and a way with him; I just 
hopefully tagged along.
We were sexist and sex-hungry (at least most of 
us, who had no partners) and, by the third year of 
our stay in China, could only “admire it from afar” 
as we crudely put it.
In that rather trying situation I, as leader, had 
the task of approaching the Chinese for a renewal 
of the originally large supply of contraceptives 
which the married couples in the group had 
thoughtfully been advised to bring with them.
My mission eventually le d . to an in-depth 
discussion with the ideological chjef of the 
institution together with a female interpreter 
whose physical attributes were particularly 
admired. I don’t know who was most disturbed by 
the encounter (sexual matters being hardly 
common subjects o f discourse in that country); but 
anything for the revolution!
In a rather remarkable parallel with official 
Roman Catholic attitudes the chief said that to 
think of sexual relations without the aim of 
procreation was “bourgeois ideology” — an 
assertion which even I, despite my then weakened 
state o f resistance to Chinese ideological 
blandishments, couldn’t cop. No doubt ready to 
commit his country to any sacrifice to save us from 
that dreaded capitalist infection, he said they 
would keep any children born because of lack of 
contraceptives. Or perhaps he hadn’t caught up 
with a new phase in the often-changed official 
policy on birth control, because we finally got the 
goods.
John’s book is not analytical, but descriptive 
and evocative of a life in the Communist Party of 
Australia from the war on. I don’t say this as a 
criticism, for the latter approach can be as 
valuable in writing history* as the former (and
often more interesting, as many will find in this 
case).
Nevertheless, while not asking the book to be 
something it is not designed to be, it would be 
vacuous to ignore some political conclusions John 
has evidently drawn from the whole experience.
As well as having quite strong differences, John 
lost heart at the lack of progress of the party, as he 
feelingly describes when he says:
“ Yet it would be quite wrong for me to give the 
impression that the differences are the m ajor 
factor for my position. I firmly believe that 
they constitute on ly one factor. My decline is 
a general political and ideological one...” 
(Letter to National Executive, foreshadowing 
resignation from the Presidency, page 227. 
The date given is June 1972; I think it should 
be 1973.)
Such honesty should be respected, certainly not 
used as the basis for jibes. I, too, have peered into 
more than one abyss.
But still, one must tackle the political issues 
raised. And in doing so I will try to take a leaf from 
John’s book and do so objectively, despite the 
added difficulty that he puts his case discursively 
as befits the aim and style o f his book, rather than 
tightly arguing it.
It is, of course, an undeniable fact that the party 
has declined greatly in numbers, influence in trade 
unions and other organisations, in revenue, 
Tribune sales, etc. The issues to be examined 
however are: the main reasons for this and the 
prospects over the next few years of reversing the 
trend.
Behind these again is the deeper question of 
whether the “rethink” of the last dozen or so years 
laid the basis for revival, or would we have done 
better by hanging onto more of the past. (I agree 
with John that we should not just rubbish our past, 
but that is not the point here.) There is also the 
related question of whether a legacy of four 
decades can be overcome in one.
This is not the time or place to attempt an 
exhaustive analysis of these difficult questions, 
and the answers to some of them may be more 
definitively revealed by events now unfolding as 
the previous period of expanding capitalism has 
been replaced by one of deepening crisis, with the 
former state, I would suggest, unlikely ever to 
recur.
I will ta ke just three points John makes about 
reasons for the decline since the ’sixties, and make 
an impressionistic appraisal of the prospects as we 
approach the ’eighties. If, in the process, I 
reinforce John’s view (page 219) that I “ rarely 
admit mistakes” , so be it.
First, it is clear that John believes the splits with 
Hill and those who formed the Socialist Party 
could have been avoided, and that if they had the
48 AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW No. 66
party would have been much the stronger as a 
result.
I believe, on the contrary, that there was no way 
to avoid the splits, except by accepting a situation 
which would have debilitated the party still more 
and prevented the development of a program, 
policies and methods of work more in accord with 
our fundamental beliefs and which at least give 
prospects of progress.
I concede some of John’s criticism of “ excesses” , 
and for the sake of argument am prepared to 
concede them all. But I still do not believe there 
was any way a group like Hill’s would have 
accepted even half the minimum requirements for 
maintaining a party in reality and not just in 
name. John’s own account surely points to this 
conclusion. And in what country in the world have 
the Maoists been, or shown preparedness to be, so 
contained?
Nor would the majority of those who now form 
S.P.A., I believe, have been prepared to refrain 
from forming a party within a party, getting out 
their own paper and using every opportunity, and 
external backing, to frustrate the carrying out of 
decisions they did not agree with. If at any 
conjuncture they had ever mustered a majority 
they would have unceremoniously “ cleaned out” 
their opponents.
I am not clear, either, whether John’s rather 
impatient and antagonistic attitude to those in the 
party he regards as “ left” is the one he advocates 
we should have adopted towards the S.P.A.  
forces, or what he thinks would have resulted if we 
had.
John had the impression from his talk with chief 
of the C.P.S.U.  International Department, 
Ponomaryev (page 203), that they wanted a 
compromise. But other C.P.S.U.  representatives 
have made it clear in more ways than one that they 
regard support for those who support them as 
having, in general, first priority.
A number of parties and party leaders tried to 
compromise, or were forced to do so — for example, 
Dubcek and the Austrians. Where did it get them?
Some other parties have been more “ patient” 
than we, for example the British and the Swedes. 
But this did not prevent eventual splitting while 
the French, who delayed confronting various 
issues, face a difficult internal situation.
A Swedish comrade I met recently, in discussing 
the course of their split, expressed the view that the 
C.P.S.U . attitude to their followers leaving or 
staying depends on whether they have prospects 
of effectively influencing in a way they want, the 
attitudes of a given party. If they cannot, it may be 
better to leave. Not much basis there for a 
principled compromise, it seems to me.
I don’t advance our course as a recipe for all. But 
neither is the reverse true. Nor can developments 
be understood in isolation from the Sino-Soviet
split, which it was and is quite beyond our power to 
significantly influence. John seems to me to 
underestimate the depth of this split, the depth of 
the motivations o f the Soviet Union’s invasion of 
Czec hos l ovaki a  to hal t  the p rocess  o f 
democratisation, and the consequences of all this 
for the movement worldwide.
Second: we should take notice of John’s great 
stress on the importance of the Labor Party in 
Australian politics and the way this impinges on 
socialist prospects. But that is the easy part. The 
more difficult question is how should we react to 
that importance.
John seems to believe that the C.P.A. should 
have and could have saved the Labor government 
from itself, as it were. “There was not enough 
extra-parliamentary backing to give the 
government guts...”  (page 181). Or go past it. That 
is true, but the reasons why are complex.
John implies that the C.P.A.’s attitude, and-our 
weakening through the splits were the main 
reasons, together with our parallel failure to 
overcome the leftism that arose among the young 
radicals from the ’sixties on. (Other nnrties. bigger 
and stronger than us als: find it difficult to 
overcome this continually recurring leftism, but 
that is by the way.)
But even if one grants all that John says, and 
accepts for the sake of argument that the issue of 
Labor policy is just a question of “quantity of 
guts” , could we have saved that government? If 
John thinks so I believe he completely misreads 
the comparative strengths of the forces involved.
The central fact was that the Labor government, 
and the left wing o f that party, and the trade union 
movement, were unable to cope with the onset of 
unexpected economic crisis. The more advanced 
elements in the trade unions and mass movements 
were also unable to fill the policy gap. Even had we 
been twice as big and three times more 
accomodating than we were, I do not believe we 
could have overcome that central obstacle.
We should have given and tried harder to rally 
greater support for Medibank and other policies in 
the areas of welfare, compensation, insurance and 
democratic rights which played a key part in 
Labor’s 1972 election victory, though we could not 
ignore, either, the “capitalist efficiency” rationale 
also contained in Labor policy, or readily 
overcome the strong “ leave it to us” pressure.
But, in any case, how could these policies, even if 
fully implemented, have overcome the soaring 
inflation and unemployment which was the basic 
cause of the Labor government’s downfall?
The one chance of saving that government was a 
sufficiently strong extra-parliamentary mass 
movement following the November 11 coup. It 
might have been a slim chance, but it was real, in a 
way other mass movements or conceivable 
movements John conjures with were not, in the
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political context we are discussing. We threw 
ourselves fully into that struggle and in the 
subsequent election cam paign, with the 
unprecedented Daily Tribune as the centre-piece of 
our effort. Hawke and other “ go quietly” 
exponents of reformism removed whatever chance 
of success there was.
We put alternatives too crudely and too tardily, it 
is true. But the main reason for this was that far 
too little had been done by any trend of opinion 
within the party to refine and develop them. 
Happily, that situation is now changing and all 
are making a contribution now.
The policy issues posed by the crisis, and the 
problem of methods of struggle posed so starkly by 
the coup, still have to be faced by Labor. But the 
mainstream of the A .L . P . has not advanced much 
beyond where they were at the time of the Hayden 
budget of 1975, while the Labor left has only just 
begun to face the problems. We should encourage 
and help. But an essential requirement for this, as 
well as for other contributions we need to make to 
massing support for radical social change, is to 
look to our own policies and build our own 
strength, especially in the labor movement.
My third point concerns the “ social (or 
liberation) movements” , of which John remarks in 
passing “ ... incorrect assessments ... of the new 
liberation movements in western society ...” 
(page 222) without specifying what those 
assessments were, or in what way they were 
incorrect.
Assessment of these movements is often 
clouded by other questions, such as the existence 
in them of “extremes” or the difficulty of having 
them subordinated to the “higher needs” of the 
class struggle. But “ extremes” have existed in the 
trade union movement, which has froii., time to 
time also exerted its autonomy against the “higher 
needs” as perceived by both right and left. Yet 
these aspects of the trade unions have not 
determined our attitude to the movement as such.
What is at issue is our assessment o f the 
substance of the liberation movements. And I 
believe that they represent something deep and 
permanent in developed capitalist countries; 
something essential to social transformation and 
crucial to its character.
Concern with them is necessary not only from 
the point o f view o f recognising “ mass 
movements” as decisive factors in politics. It is 
also a corrective to the endemic “ economism” and 
reliance on action from the top by big state and big 
government, which has afflicted the whole 
Australian left and the trade union movement.
A more responsive attitude to them than John 
displays could also help overcome the narrow and 
dogmat i c  interpretat i ons  o f  capi tal i s t  
contradictions, relations of production, class etc., 
on which we were brought up and which 
continually reappear in new forms.
A few remarks by way o f overview and 
conclusion.
Calls for “ realism” are healthy. But is it 
necessarily realistic, even in times ofquiescenceor 
retreat of the movement such as we have been 
experiencing, to reject future “ upheavals” and the 
part they may play in developments?
Can we look today’s world in the eye without 
seeing the accumulating material for vast 
upheavals and conflicts of various kinds? In the 
past most of these passed Australia by, it is true. 
But today, the dimensions and depth of the crisis, 
which we have continually stressed, are being 
recognised on all sides. Bob Hawke, Manning 
Clark and Brian Dixon, Victoria’s Minister for 
Social Welfare and Youth, each in their separate 
ways, see upheaval ahead. (The last-named 
predicts a possible 31 per cent unemployment by 
1984 — Financial Review, August 7.)
To talk about the upheavals developing 
conditions are likely to create is not to revert to the 
“re-run of 1917” syndrome, which has little 
currency in our party these days. The policies we 
now have, and the program we are putting 
together I regard as developing fairly directly from 
what we (John included) started in the second half 
o f the ’sixties and which certainly didn’t envisage 
an even path.
Holding to and developing this course holds the 
best prospects for us to ascend from the plateau we 
have been on for the last few years. And there are 
good signs about. There have been good signs 
before, it is true, and they have failed to “jell” . But, 
for what it is worth, I have growing confidence 
they will. The strength of reactions to the budget, I 
believe, are of more than passing significance. 
Support for, or acceptance of, the Fraser 
government and belief that it can deliver the goods 
it promised have turned a corner on a downward 
path.
The question is will we be sufficiently advanced 
in policy, cohesive enough in organisation and 
adequately energetic in action to meet the 
challenge?
* Lloyd Churchward is wrong when he says 
(review of Comrades Come Rally, Tribune, July 19, 
1978) that nothing more was heard from 
discussions in 1967 about party history or the 
History Commission established by the 21st 
Congress.
The Commission concluded, and their view was 
accepted, that the party should not try to produce, 
or have produced, any “official” history. The 
reasons should be fairly evident. Instead, 
individual people or ad hoc groups should be 
encouraged to make their own contribution, with 
whatever assistance by way of records etc. the 
party could give. John’s book is one such 
contribution.
Civilisation at the Crossroads: social 
and human implications o f the scientific 
and technological revolution, $4.50 (300 
pp.), 1969.
Some copies of this very important pioneering 
work are still available. Published by A LR  in
1969, the book is the work of a Czechoslovak 
interdisciplinary research team headed by 
Radovan Richta. It appeared late in 1967 in 
Czechoslovakia and undoubtedly resulted from 
the deep concern with the crisis in economy, 
politics and ideology which came to a head there at 
that time.
Its findings in turn provided the theoretical 
basis for the A ction  Program  developed by the 
Czechoslovak Communist Party to meet that 
crisis.
These national aspects do not, however, detract 
from the universality of the problems dealt with. 
The book is a first-class piece of research and 
analysis about issues confronting all advanced 
industrial societies, as apt today as it was whep 
publ i shed.  Over  300 pages  o f  text  are 
supplemented by extensive tables and references. 
At today’s prices, it is selling cheaply.
Antonio Gramsci: The Man, His Ideas,
by Alastair Davidson (100 pp.), 1969. $2.
This short book was one of the first works 
published in English about the life and work of the 
Italian marxist thinker and communist leader. It 
is still a valuable reference for those interested in 
Gramsci’s contribution to marxist thought and 
socialist politics.
The Debate o n .....
“ EUROCOMMUNISM”
Documents and articles from overseas 
publications, as well as contributions to the 
discussion by Australian writers.
$1.00 per copy.
A vailable from  Australian Left R eview , Box 
A 247, Sydney South P.O., Sydney. 2000; or 
from  le ft booksh ops listedon back page.
A NOTE TO 
CONTRIBUTORS
ALR is only too happy to receive contributions on 
any subject of interest to the left and the labor 
movement. We prefer the length to be less than 
5,000 words but exceptions are made in special 
cases.
We prefer articles, on whatever subject, to be 
accessible to all interested readers prepared to 
make an effort, and therefore request that 
unnecessary jargon or "academese" be avoided. 
For time and space considerations, we reserve the 
right to cut articles where this does not affect the 
basic sense of the discussion. Occasionally we 
propose style or sub editing changes but only in co 
consultation with the author(s).
We ask that all manuscripts be typed, double­
spaced, on paper no larger than quarto size.
We ask those authors who do not hear from us 
about publication of their articles in a reasonable 
time to recognise that this is purely due to pressure 
of other work on our small collective. Usually we 
have not forgotten you.
* * * * *
APPEAL FOR BACK NUMBERS
Remaining gaps in our stock of back numbers 
have now been filled with the exception of numbers 
36 and 38. We make a special appeal to readers 
who might have copies of these two issues which 
they no longer require to send them to us so that 
requests for them can be met. In addition, we 
would still be grateful for copies of numbers 29, 32 
and 41, as numbers of these held by us are still 
small.
